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Summary findings
Collectively or individually, countries are likely to  How policymakers choose to implement emission
implement policies designed to limit greenhouse gas  limits will significantly shape the incentives that drive
emissions. Experience from tradable quota schemes  evolving secondary markets for greenhouse-gas-based
suggests that emissions trading could significantly reduce  instruments. Potential market participants who were
the costs of emission limits.  surveyed rate policy-related risk as higher than business-
The Kyoto Protocol provides the framework for a  related risks.
common trading mechanism for all countries - Domestic policies designed to reduce fragmentation in
including countries that would not face immediate  secondary markets, establish clear baselines and
emission limits. Significantly, the Protocol places the  procedures, and strengthen host-country institutions can
responsibility for meeting emission limits with national  all help reduce the risks and costs of emission limits.
governments.
This paper - a product of the Development Research Group - is part of a larger effort in the group to support more cost-
effective environmental regulations. Copies of the paper  are available free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street NW,
Washington, DC 20433. Please contact Pauline Kokila, room MC3-544,  telephone 202-473-3716,  fax 202-522-1150,
Internet  address  pkokila@worldbank.org.  Policy Research Working  Papers  are  also posted  on  the  Web  at  http://
www.worldbank.org/html/dec/Publications/Workpapers/home.html.  Donald  Larson  may  be  contacted  at
dlarson@worldbank.org. March 1999.  (54 pages)
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the excbange of  ideas about
development issues.  An objective of the series  is to get the findings out quickly, even if  the p-resentations  are  less than fully  polished  .The
papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The  findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this
paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the view of the World Bang  its Executiere  Directors, or the
countries they represent.
Produced  by the  Policy  Research  Dissemination  CenterRIsKs,  LESSONS  LEARNED  AND  SECONDARY  MARKETS  FOR
GREENHOUSE  GAS REDUCTIONS
DONALD  F. LARSoN  AND  PAUL  PARKS
Donald  Larson is an economist  in the World  Bank's Research  Department  and Paul Parks is a researcher
with the Norwegian  group,  ECON.Table of Contents
I. Introduction  1
II.  Carbon  Credits, Risks, and Secondary Markets  2
Greenhouse  gases,  international  treaties  and assumptions  about markets  2
The marketing  chain  for carbon  credits  3
Risk management:  lessons  from other markets  9
Summary  results  16
111.  A Survey of Key Actors_  20
Introduction  20
About  the survey  20
Domestic  greenhouse  gas regimes  21
Utilization  ofjoint implementation  22
Performance  and sovereign  risk  24
Monitoring,  validation  and certification  25
Secondary  markets  26
Carbon  funds  28
Summary  results  29
IV. Conclusions  33
Way  forward  34
Annex I: Case Studies in Tradable Permits  35
1. Fish and individual  tradable quotas:  lessons  from New Zealand,  Iceland and elsewhere  35
2. Leaded gas phasedown  38
3. Sulfur  dioxide  allowances  in the United States  40
4. The Dutch covenant  with electricity  producers  47
5. Regional  clean air incentive  market  48
Bibliography  52Tables
Table 1: Pricing features  of alternative policies affecting the use of carbon credits.  19
Table 2: Likely sources of risk in the carbon credit market, by category.  19
Table 3: Characteristics of selected tradablefish  quota programs.  38
Table 4: Sulfur dioxide emission limits under the USAcid Rain program.  44
Table 5: SO2 emission allowance prices.  45
Table 6: Expected prices and compliance costs.  51
Figures
Figure 1: Marketing chain for carbon credits  17
Figure 2: Cap-and-trade domestic marketfor  credits.  18
Figure 3: Carbon-tax and the domestic credit market.  18
Figure 4: Alternative  domestic markets for central-control countries  19
Figure 5: Domestic regimes  31
Figure  6: Preferences on management ofJl  31
Figure 7: Perceived project  risks  31
Figure 8: Policy risks  32
Figure 9: Certification and baseline risks  32
Figure 10. Market risks  32
Figure 11: Sulfur dioxide emissions by regulated US utilities.  45
Figure 12: Composition of SO2 allowance trade, by market.  45
Figure 13: SO2 allowances acquired by utilities, March 1994 to March 1997.  46
Figure 14: Auction prices for NO. credits, by vintage.  51
iiRISKS, LESSONS LEARNED AND SECONDARY MARKETS
FOR GREENHOUSE GAS REDUCTIONS
DONALD  F. LARSON  AND  PAUL  PARKS
L INTRoDucTIoN
Viewed simply, free markets fail to capture the full but uncertain costs of releasing
additional greenhouse gases into the earth's atmosphere. Moreover, the effects of additional
greenhouse gas emissions are global rather than local, so that a ton of carbon released into the
atmosphere will have substantially  the same effect on the climate regardless of the source.  The
framework agreement discussed in Kyoto recognizes the global nature of the problem and
proposes how greenhouse gas emissions might be limited by international treaty.  Further,
proposed implementation mechanisms -- including  joint implementation, the Clean Development
Mechanisms and emission trading-- offer the potential for global incentives to reduce emissions
wherever they are to be had at least cost.  This is significant,  since experience has shown that
public expenditures are insufficient to affect measurably affect the global problem.  Consequently
changes in incentives are crucial to change private activities and redirect private investment.
The purpose of this paper is to look at the incentives and markets these mechanisms are
likely to engender. Moreover, risks will be examined as well since they are central to investment
decisions. In turn, because the Kyoto framework is designed to address a market failure, the
incentive and risks it fosters will be dependent on implementing agreements and institutions rather
than underlying consumer demand. Although less common, this type of market is not unique and
lessons from similar markets are presented.
Subsequent to this introduction, the paper is organized as follows.  The second section of
the paper speculates on how joint implementation and an international market for carbon credits
might work and analyzes different components of risk along the marketing chain. Risk
management lessons are drawn from other markets, including markets for tradable emission
permits and tradable quotas.  Section three presents the results from a survey of potential market
participants on their perception of future markets for carbon credits and associated risks. Section
four concludes. Additionally, an Annex is provided containing more detailed information about
five of the tradable permit and quota programs from which lessons are drawn and presented in
earlier sections.II.  CARBON CREDITS, RISKS,  AND SECONDARY MARKETS
Greenhouse  gases, international  treaties  and assumptions about  markets
The earth constantly receives energy from the sun, mostly as visible light, and radiates
energy back into space, primarily as invisible  infrared light. Water vapor, clouds and the long-
lived gases, including carbon dioxide, reduce the outflow of radiated light creating an energy
imbalance known as the "greenhouse effect".  It is widely believed the accumulated release of
carbon dioxide from combustible fossil fuels over the past century has increased the energy*
imbalance resulting in a warming of the earth's surface. The consequences for the earth's climate
however are not known and the processes poorly understood.  Extreme climate changes have
occurred naturally and it is unclear how human activity might influence natural cycles.
Mathematical modeling exercises suggest that under some circumstances, the consequences can be
severe and carry significant  risks and costs for society'.  This is especially  true if the pace of
climate change overwhelms the adaptive abilities  of biological systems. However, similar models
also show that the costs of limiting emissions can be high and are sensitive to implementation
choices. Further, the costs and benefits of climate change and emission limits are not equally
shared, and any course of action will have distribution effects.
Potential adverse effects of climate change represent a common problem for all nations,
and in recent years, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change has provided
an institutional setting to discuss and implement  joint solutions.  A product of that convention, the
Kyoto Protocol, provides an initial framework for an agreement on greenhouse gas emission goals
and suggests several ways in which the costs of emission limits can be lowered2 Chief among
these are provisions for emissions trading and joint implementation. Under the terms of the
agreement Annex I3 countries -- would reduce their emission levels from 1990 levels in a 2008-
2012 commitment period and show progress toward meeting those reductions by 2005.4
Potentially, countries in deficit can purchase emission allowances from countries in surplus or earn
carbon credits by investing in projects that reduce emissions elsewhere -- including countries that
have not agreed to constrain emissions. Broadly, such investments are known as joint
implementation schemes, however a distinction is made in the Kyoto Protocol between projects
arranged by two Annex I countries and other projects. 5
IModel results are reviewed  in The  Kyoto  Protocol  and the  President's  Policies  to  Address Climate  Change:  Administration
Economic  Analysis at http://www.weathervane.rff.org/refdocs/wh  analysis.pdf
2See  Jacoby,  Prinm  and Schmalensee  (1998)  for an excellent  overview  of climate  change  issues and the role of the Kyoto
Protocol.
3Annex I is a list comprising  39 developed  and transitional  economies:  Australia,  Austria,  Belarus,  Belgium,  Bulgaria,  Canada,
Czechoslovakia,  Denmark,  Estonia,  Finland,  France,  Germany,  Greece,  Hungary,  Iceland,  Ireland,  Italy,  Japan, Latvia,
Lithuania,  Luxembourg,  Netherlands,  New Zealand,  Norway,  Poland,  Portugal,  Romania,  Russian  Federation,  Spain,
Sweden,  Switzerland,  Turkey,  Ukraine,  United  Kingdom,  and the United States.
4The Protocol  goes  into force  when  Parties to the Convention  signing  the Protocol  represent  55% or more  of the total 1990  CO 2
emissions.
5The Kyoto  Protocol  defines  a Clean Development  Mechanism  under  which  Annex  I countries  promote  emission  reductions  in
non-Annex  I countries  in exchange  for credit  against emission  limits, reserving  the term joint implementation  for  projects
among  Annex  I countries. In addition,  in Kyoto-Protocol  parlance,  the carbon  credits  generated  by  joint implementation
projects  are termed "earned  reduction  units" while  credits  generated  under  the Clean Development  Mechanism  are called
"certified emission  reductions."
2Currently, joint implementation projects are largely experimental, and the compensation
mechanism is usually a public or private grant 6. However, the Kyoto Protocol envisions a legal
and regulatory framework that would credit project owners for reducing emissions. The credits
are offsets against a presumed alternative -- or counterfactual. Project owners are rewarded or
credited for this hypothetical reduction in kind-- that is, the credits are denominated in tons-of-
carbon.  The credit can be used to offset emissions elsewhere, or perhaps to pay for energy taxes. 7
The cost of producing credits will be determined by the additional costs of reducing
emissions by adopting the lower-emission technology or developing additional carbon sinks, and
participants will seek out low-cost reductions across national borders. However, the value and
utility of a carbon credit will depend, in addition to normal supply and demand conditions, on
policy set out by the international agreement, and the domestic policies established to implement
the agreement. Users of "imported" carbon credits may well have scope for choosing the country
hosting joint implementation projects, but will face prevailing home-country rules when using
credits. Consequently, identical carbon credits can have potentially different values depending
upon where they are used.
In order to look at how secondary markets might operate, we must speculate on what a
working international agreement might look like. For the purposes of this paper, we will assume
that an international agreement is reached along the lines of the Kyoto Protocol that allows joint
implementation projects for tradable credits against country emission limit commitments. Country
governments will retain responsibility and authority on how the agreement is implemented  within
their borders as long as the implementation conforms to the broader international framework
agreement.  Consequently, the markets for credits will be affected by the domestic policies of
governments hosting joint implementation projects and by the policies of governments in which the
credits are used.  Later we further distinguish  among three approaches that Annex I countries
mnight  take toward tradable credits when managing their emission limits. The three categories are
drawn from historic approaches toward emission  controls and are also based on positions put
forward during the on-going debate over post-Kyoto implementation strategies8.
The marketing chain for carbon credits
In this section we turn our attention to the likely way in which carbon credits might be
created, sold and used.  This process is depicted in Figure 1. Generally, offsets can be created by
making additional investments in a project that reduce greenhouse gas emissions-- for example,
refitting a power generation plant to burn fuel more efficiently. The "credit" earned for this
investment is determined by the difference between the "clean" version and a counter-factual
baseline of "what would have been."  It is likely that local institutions will monitor and verify the
process of generating the credits -- a process that can span many years.  Once verified, the credits
6 The  UNFCC  surveyed  govemments,  intemational  organizations  and NGOs  on their joint implementation  - also known  as
actions implemented  jointly (AUF-  activities. Their  report  can be viewed  at:
http://www.unfccc.de/fccc/docsI1998/sb/miscO2.htm.  The  US General  Accounting  Office  has also issued  a report  on the
US JI program,  "Climate  change:  information  on the US initiative  on Joint Implementation."  (GAO/RCED-98-154.)  The
report attempts  to measure  the benefits  of the US program,  but notes  that JI program  staff "do not verify  or attest  to the
reliability  of the net greenhouse  gas benefits"  because  of lacking  standards.
Currently  in Denmark,  some  companies  meeting  voluntary  energy-conservation  goals  qualify  for tax relief
8For example,  see Downie  et al. (1998)  for a recent review  of EU country  positions  on emissions  trading
3must be recognized  or certified  as meeting  the international  standards  for tradable  credits
established  under  the international  agreement.  Governments  are ultimately  responsible  for meeting
reduction  targets pledged  in Kyoto and  government  policy  will determine  how credits  can  be used
domestically.
Markets  are likely  to evolve  as the process  is implemented.  Broadly,  these  would  include
markets  associated  with carbon  credit  projects  -- for example  a market for bonds  financing  carbon-
offset  projects;  markets  in certified  credits 9 -- including  perhaps  spot, forward and futures  markets;
and finally  domestic  markets  that are potentially  poorly  integrated  with international  markets.
Below,  we look at some  of the risks  associated  with each stage  of the process  and with evolving
markets.
Project level risks
During  the planning  stage,  investors  will  need  to determine  the how many  credits  will  be
generated  by the project,  and at what cost. Since  the offsets  are generated  against  a counterfactual
or baseline,  clear rules must be established  in order  for the firm  to estimate  costs and benefits. To
qualify for credits, the project managers must determine additionality -- that is they must show
that the reductions  claimed  are above  and beyond  reductions  that would  have  taken place  without
the project. Since  a project may  be long-lived,  determining  additionality  may  mean estimating
reductions  against  forecasted  changes  in technology." 0 Further,  factors  such as project  or country
risk also determine  whether  investments  of a certain  type are reasonable  alternatives." Moreover,
if the country  is subject  to overall  emission  budget,  there is an additional  constraint  that the budget
is not exceeded. 12
Often  in project  financing,  the planning  and construction  phase  of a project is considered
riskier  and less secure  than the financing  of on-going  firms. Consequently,  project  financing  is
often structured  to reflect  the changes  in risk as the project  is developed. Below,  we consider  two
phases  of project  risk.
9 London's  International  Petroleum  Exchange  and the Sydney  Futures  Exchange  have put forward separate  proposals  for
trading Kyoto-based  emission  allowances.
10  Goulder  and Mathai (1997)  discuss  this issue in detail.
IIn the Kyoto  Protocol,  the concept  of additionality  is addressed  in Article 12.
12See Chonmtz  (1998)  for a treatment  of baselining  and additionality  issues.
4Project preparation and construction
Establishing appropriate standards will likely remain the province of govermuents, however
private firms -- for example, engineering firms -- are likely to take part in the process as well.
Consequently, components of bothpolicy risks and private performance risk will be present in
determining the hypothetical reduction in emissions. At the project preparation stage, the primary
private performance risks concern the company's own calculations about the process generating
the credits --for example, assumptions about the performance and cost of the technology or the
profitability of the project.  In addition, the sovereign or policy risks can be multifold. Under
current joint implementation experiments, sponsoring countries are primarily responsible for
approving joint implementation projects and criteria differ from country to country. Even under
the more structured framework envisioned by the Kyoto Protocol, sponsoring countries may well
retain some authority over project qualification. Moreover, host countries may also want to
participate in defining additionality and project qualifications -- especially if the joint
implementation project affects the host-country baseline. Potentially, the two definitions could
conflict. Moreover, large energy projects such as hydroelectric dams are years in the planning.
For such projects, the policies of either country, or even the intemational agreement itself, could
change materially during the preparation and construction.
Project life risks
During the life of the project other risks emerge.  Chief among these is the underlying
economic performance of the project.  For example, a biomass project might function exactly as
engineers predict, but fail because of a decline in the demand or price of electricity. For regulated
industries in particular, the economic performance may be dependent on policy as well. Indeed,
shutdowns may well increase as energy markets liberalize and specialization occurs.  Who bears
such risks depends partly on ownership. For example, joint implementation investors who hold
bonds rather than equity may face different levels of exposure.
Additional risks may stem from price fluctuations for the underlying carbon credit.  The
economic performance of the project may be threatened if the credit revenue is crucial to the
success of the project.  Alternatively, if the firm is obligated to provide a certain tonnage of credits
to investors, investors take on price risk.  If secondary markets and hedging instruments emerge--
issues covered later in this paper-- then risks might be dispersed to third parties.
Finally, the rules of the game can change during the life of the project.  Changes in
baselines, domestic regulatory requirements, changes in the destination market policies can all
occur during the life of the project.  At one extreme, international law recognizes the sovereignty
of nations over their natural resources and countries have the authority to simply nationalize
emission credits.  Or, in a less extreme case, a cap-and-trade' 3 destination country might make
marginal changes in the cap, changing supply conditions and prices.
Monitoring,  verification and certification
Generated emission reductions must be verified. For most projects this means comparing
measurable emissions over time against an unmeasurable counterfactual baseline, and on-going
monitoring may be required.  Possibly, as with some programs designed to limit air pollution in the
United States, continuous monitoring equipment might be used.  Third party inspectors might be
13  Cap-and-trade  regimes  are discussed  later.
5hired  to validate  the reduction,  much  like  independent  auditors  or commodity  quality  inspectors.
Verification  might automatically  lead  to certification  -- perhaps  subject  to possible  ex post review.
Alternatively,  a review  process  may  be required  prior to certification.
The Kyoto  Protocol is open to interpretation,  and modalities  for verification  and
certification  are works in progress. However,  it is likely  that the authority  for establishing  broad
criteria  and  ultimate  authority  for certification  of emission  reduction  units will rest with an
institution  established  by the agreement. Still,  practical  issues  of implementing  the validation
process  will  most likely  fall to governments.  In turn, governments  may  choose  to empowering
private inspectors,  enforcing  quality  through  spot checks.
In practice,  there are likely  to be large differences  in the reliability  and timeliness  of various
host country  institutions  engaged  in verifying  carbon  offsets. Failures  in validation  negate any
environmental  improvements  and could erode  overall  support  and confidence  for the international
agreement.  Risks associated  with delays  or failures  in validating  and certifying  bonifide  offsets  fall
to the owners  of the credit  rights.
Investors, users and secondary markets
Users  of carbon  credits  may  choose  to generate  credits  through  direct investments  or they
may  choose to purchase  certified  credits. Direct  investments  may  be managed  internally  within  the
fium,  or, as discussed  later,  firms  may  want to diversify  their risks  by participating  with other
investors  in a pool of projects. Regardless,  it is unlikely  that all firms  would  want to, or be able  to
manage  both the supply  and demand  for credits  internally.  Even investors  in pools will  face  the
risk  that the fund will  under perform,  producing  too few or poorly  timed  credits. Such  risks
become  less  problematic  if efficient  secondary  markets  exist  from which  to purchase  or sell
additional  credits  as needed. Storage,  or in this case,  the ability  to save  reduction  credits  for
future use, facilitates  liquidity  as well and reduces  volatility.
Transaction  costs are higher  when markets  are thin. Under  such circumstances  quoted
prices  become  less  reliable  and large  purchase  or sell orders  can move  the market against  large
volume  buyers  or sellers  and encourage  private  placements.  Further,  for planning  and risk
management  purposes,  users  might  want to purchase  forward  or perhaps  purchase  options  on
future credits. Consequently,  the market  works best when spot, forward and option markets  are
liquid.
Liquid  and efficient  markets  are characterized  by many  active  buyers  and sellers,  high
volume  and abundant  information.  Transactions  involving  heterogeneous  items require  more
information  and it is frequently  harder  to match  buyers  and sellers. For example,  markets  for
commodities  or US Treasury  bills  tend to deal  in homogenous  goods, so transactions  are enacted
quickly  and at low cost. On the other hand real  estate markets  or deal  in more heterogeneous
goods, so search and closing  costs are higher.
The issue of heterogeneity  is potentially  problematic  for carbon-credits  based assets  prior
to certification  since  the risk characteristics  ofjoint implementation  projects and country-based
regulatory  institutions  will differ.  Until credits  are standardized  through  certification,  buyers  will
want to distinguish  among  carbon-credit  assets  based  on the time,  host-country  and project
characteristics.
6Domestic marketsfor  credits
As stated earlier, governments are likely to retain authority over the domestic use of
carbon credits. Profoundly different views exist about the appropriate instruments for achieving
emission reductions.  Country experiences and country energy sectors differ as well and it is likely
that diverse approaches will emerge as countries begin to implement reduction strategies.
Consequently, incentives to invest in greenhouse gas reductions will differ among countries as
well.  This point is illustrated by examining  three dominant approaches that are likely to emerge.
Cap-and-trade approach
Under cap-and-trade emission regimes, governments allocate a fixed number of emission
allowances or permits to private and public entities and require all significant  emitters to match
permits and emissions. Tradable permits are an important component of the US Acid Rain
program for example, and two Canadian regional pilot programs, are applying the approach to
greenhouse gas emissions based on voluntary reductions l4.  The Japanese Ministry of International
Trade and Industry also supports emission-trading pilots. For the purposes of discussion, we will
assume some governments will choose to allocate emission  allowances to public and private permit
holders and that these permit holders are free to trade permits within the country and with private
and public entities of other countries that limit emissions. Further, we assume that additional
permits can be created through properly certified  joint implementation  projects in any country."
Some countries may choose to place limits on the number of new permits generated through joint
implementation.
In the stylized cap-and-trade system presented here, the government allocates, for each
time period, a fixed set of emission permits 16. This allocation, plus any banked permits, is
represented by Quota in Figure 2.  In addition, credits from other countries can be imported to
supplement domestic permits.  The curved arrow in the figure represents the supply of credits --
quota, savings plus credits.
Under cap-and-trade regimes, emissions must be matched with perrnits at the end-of-the
accounting period.  Consequently, carbon-based fuels must be consumed jointly with permits and
we would expect the demand curve for credits to look something like a derived demand curve for
carbon fuels.  This is represented by the downward sloping line.'7
As drawn, the consuming country is a price taker and the international price of greenhouse
gases credits would prevail domestically. In turn, the price of credits would equal the marginal
cost of generating certifiable emission reductions. The country would import a portion of the
international supply of credits.  The effects of trade are to decrease the permit price from Pd to Pw
and increase emissions from the country from Quota to Qt.  The net effect globally on emissions is
These  two Canadian  programs  are British Colombia's  GHG  Reduction  Trading  Pilot Project  and Ontario's Pilot  Emissions
Reduction  Trading  Project.
Policy  makers  charged  with negotiating  Kyoto  implementation  usually  distinguish  between  trading allowances  among  Annex
I countries  and trading credits  generating  by JI projects. Several  countries  oppose  enmission  trading in general  and propose
strict lirits  on the use of n1  credits. These countries  emphasize  burden  sharing  and see emissions  trading  as a wuy  of
shirking  agreed  upon commitments.
16  a description  of a working  cap-and-trade  program,  see the US SO 2 market  case study  in Annex  I.
17A  cautionary  note is in order. Mapping  out demand  and supply  curves  requires  a homogenization  of the credits. As noted
earlier, the credits  all carry  project-specific,  country-specific  risks that would  differentiate  credits  and fragment  markets.
We will return  to solutions  from other  markets  later.
7zero, since the credits were generated by reductions elsewhere. Should prices rise above Pd, the
country would export credits. 18
Carbon-tax approach
Several countries have proposed using a fossil fuel tax to limit domestic demand for
carbon-based fuels and thereby limit emissions. A carbon-tax was proposed for the EU and several
countries, including Finland, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden have levied carbon-taxes in the
past.  For the discussion below, we assume some countries will use a carbon tax to manage overall
emissions, but will allow private firms to use tradable joint implementation credits to meet tax
obligations.
The effects of a carbon-tax policy can be quite similar to a cap-and-trade system under
certain circumstances. In Figure 3, the downward sloping line represents the demand for
greenhouse-gas-emitting fuels.  The price for the fuels, inclusive of the carbon tax, is Pe + t.  If all
firms are allowed to always substitute credits for taxes and if the price of credits is less than the
tax, then Pe + c, where c is the cost of the credit, becomes the relevant marginal price of fuels, and
consumption increases from Qt to Qc.  The effects on the environment are neutral, since the
consumption is offset through reductions elsewhere. However, unlimited substitution drains
government treasury revenue, so countries may choose to limit the number of credits.  In this case,
the marginal price of fuel remains at Pe + t.  The substitution results in a transfer equal to the area
market TR in Figure 3.
Alternatively, if the carbon tax (t) is cheaper than emission credits (h), firms will choose to
pay the tax rather than purchase the credits. The impact on the environment is negative, relative to
pricing the emission at world prices. Fuel consumption remains at Qt rather than falling to Qh and
emissions do not decrease.
Central-control approach
Many countries have taken a regulatory approach to limiting emissions and some will most
likely continue to do so in the future -- especially where underlying energy markets are non-
competitive. For these countries we assume that regulatory agencies rather than private markets
will decide on investments in carbon credits.
Still, governments that chooses to control investments in joint implementation may use a
variety of instruments to manage emission limit obligations. In fact, a centrally controlled joint
implementation program can coexist with domestic cap-and-trade systems, or a system of
managing domestic demand through a carbon tax.  For example, govermnents might limit
international trade in permits, but invest directly in joint implementation projects.  In such cases,
credits generated through joint implementation  projects would allow less stringent caps (panel 1 in
Figure 4) or lower carbon taxes (panel 2 in Figure 4).  However, the domestic cost of carbon
emissions however, would only coincidentally  equal the marginal cost of carbon reductions
through joint implementation.
Alternatively, the government may chose to control emissions by requiring that firms use
"best available technologies", or specifying other production controls.  Credits generated through
joint implementation would allow governments to relax the restrictions somewhat, moving the
internal economy closer to the optimal mix of inputs.  This is depicted in the bottom panel of
18  Holling  and Somerville  (1998)  examine  the gains from  trade in carbon  allowance  permits.
8Figure 4, where industry is allowed to substitute credits for capital. Restricting joint
implementation may however artificially  increase the domestic price for credits, resulting in a
domestic under-utilization of credits.
Risks andfinal  demand
Carbon credits have value because of regulation and law, and risks from changes in
relevant regulations will pervade all destination markets.  In addition, open systems that allow free
trade in carbon credits will face additional price risks, since changes in the international markets
for joint implementation credits will be reflected in domestic markets.  Changes in technology are
likely to affect all markets.  In open systems, changes in technology will alter demand and supply
conditions and prices. For regulated systems, changing technology will likely result in changing
requirements.
The various approaches discussed above will differ in the incentives  they offer for private
capital to enter the market for joint implementation and in how the marginal cost of producing
offsets globally are reflected in domestic prices. The features of the systems are presented in Table
1. Generally, systems open to unlimited credit use will offer more appropriate incentives for
private capital flows to low-cost abatement areas. In addition, the marginal cost of generating
credits internationally are better reflected in domestic producer and consumer prices. As a
consequence however, price risks associated with the carbon-offset market will also be reflected in
open domestic markets.
How domestic policies effect the underlying international agreement in the aggregate is
difficult to predict.  Policies that prevent private firms from investing in joint implementation
projects will raise the cost of carbon limits in the aggregate and may erode support for the
agreement. Further, a patchwork of domestic policies and domestic prices for abatement will
generate different incentives that may prove distortionary, especially for emission-sensitive
industries and markets such as aluminum  production or deregulated electricity markets.
Accordingly, disadvantaged firms, sectors and countries will look for ways to evade or avoid the
binding constraints of the international agreement.
Risk  management:  lessons  from other  markets" 9
In Table 2, risks associated with the creation and use of carbon emission credits along the
marketing chain are broadly classified into three categories comprising private performance risks,
sovereign or policy risks, and price risk. Risks of all types differ also in scope.  Some risks
associated with potential changes in fundamental rules of the game are pervasive and impossible
for individual  market participants to manage. Idiosyncratic risks that are country or project
specific can be more readily handled through pooling and diversification. In this section, we draw
on lessons in risk management from other markets and other agreements to suggest ways of
handling related risks in the market for carbon credits.
Risks associated with the international agreement
Carbon credits derive their value from the joint implementation process.  They exist against
a counter-factual and have no intrinsic worth as a consumable good, or an input to production.
19 See Annex I for a more detailed discussion of individual tradable permit programs.
9Genuine reductions in emissions may benefit the public good, but will have no market value until
they are recognized and certified for use.  Conversely, false reductions, if improperly certified,
have market value. As with money, the role of government is central to the creation of credits.
Also, like money, credits will be used to meet obligations to government, including in some
instances tax obligations. Consequently, the framework agreed upon internationally is
fundamental to the development of markets and investments. Experience from other agreements
suggest that resolving several key issues listed below will strengthen the agreement and reduce
risks faced by investors.
Political  economy  of agreement
Until agreements reached under the Kyoto Protocol have proved effective in reducing
greenhouse gas emissions and in providing a framework for joint imnplementation,  potential
investors will fear fundamental changes in the rules of the game.  Successful agreements require a
commitment  by all major stakeholders.  In turn, the agreement has to provide clear goals and
procedures.
The rise and fall of commodity agreements, including agreements on cocoa, coffee, sugar
and tin, during the last thirty years illustrates how failure to include binding agreements from key
players can erode support for the agreement. (See Varangis and Larson, 1996.) For example, US
resistance to include Cuba led to the demise of one of the sugar agreements. In another instance,
countries like Vietnam were able to expand market share at the expense of other producers by
remaining outside an agreement on coffee, ultimately contributing to the demise of the agreement.
Similarly,  there is a concern that differences in regulatory costs under a greenhouse gas agreement
would create welfare advantages for those remaining outside of the agreement.  For example,
consumers in some countries may face higher costs and lower employment opportunities due to
the agreement.  In addition, because energy-intensive  may relocate to countries where emissions
are unregulated, the collective environmental gains from the agreement can be reduced as well,
thereby eroding the basic rationale for the agreement. 20 Even if all countries are brought into the
agreement, differences in domestic credit-use policies can generate differences in the cost of
emissions among countries, potentially increasing the cost of reducing emissions globally and
locally, leading to artificial trade advantages and eroding support for the treaty.
Successful programs often pass through an extended process of consensus building. As the
number of stakeholders rise, this task becomes more difficult. An early tradable permit scheme
designed to remove lead from gasoline in the United States proved successful and adaptable in part
because of the small number of refiners involved. Tradable quota schemes for fisheries have been
successfully employed in Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States.  However, in
Iceland, the government failed to establish a consensus backing tradable quotas and some in
Iceland argue that existing quotas immorally exclude citizens from their livelihood. For
international agreements, reaching a consensus on what constitutes a fair and just method of
resolving environmental problems can be especially elusive. 2'
Often consensus building begins with comparative studies, but ends with a period of deal
making. For example, permitted emission levels under the US Acid Rain program and California's
smog-reducing RECLAIM program were initially set at non-binding  lev'els  with scheduled
See Jacoby  et al. (1997)  for  a review  and discussion  of welfare  burdens  and "carbon  leakage"  from a CO 2 agreement.
21 See Albin (1995)  for a discussion  on justice,  fairness  and acid  rain emission  reductions.
10reductions to facilitate acceptance.  If restrictions are based on historic performance, regulated
firms are frequently given some choice on the base-year upon which reductions are based. For the
RECLAIM program, firms could choose one of four years as a starting point.  In New Zealand,
fishermen could base their quota on one of three years and could appeal quota decisions. In the
New Zealand case, a tribunal set up to hear complaints raised quotas in half of the cases.  In some
agreements, targeted exceptions are made. For example, during contentious Uruguay-Round
negotiations on agriculture, favored programs such as sugar in the EU and tobacco in the US were
largely exempted from reform (Josling, et al. 1996.)
Reaching an agreement often involves an "escape" clause, should the costs of the
agreement become too high.  A series of "safeguards" are built into the Uruguay Round (Croome,
1996.) Likewise, under the RECLAIM program, high market prices for traded permits would
trigger a review of the program.  In the Dutch covenant with electricity producers, emission limits
can be breached under a variety of circumstances.
Managing change
Successful agreements frequently establish the pace of reform as well.  Often actions are
spread out over multiple years to minimize adjustment costs. For example, tariff reductions
mandated under the Uruguay Round of GATT come in ten annual installments for developing
countries (Croome, 1996). In the US, the 1990 Clean Air Act set out a phased reform program
designed to conclude in 2010.  Similarly,  the 1997 Kyoto Protocol asks that parties show
demonstrable progress by 2005 but defines the commitment period as 2008-2012.
Not all events will be anticipated, new information  will emerge and adjustments will be
required.  Indeed, the Kyoto convention (Article 9) calls for periodic review. Changes and
interventions can introduce additional risks, but these need not preclude functioning markets. In
fact, periodic adjustments are often necessary for the long-term well being of the market.
Interventions by central banks are frequent and the process is well understood by bond markets.
In some tradable permit markets, especially  fish quota markets, adjustments are scheduled. For
example, in the successful New Zealand fisheries management program, individuals hold long-
terms claims on a portion of the annual catch rather than a weight-denominated quota. Decisions
on the total catch are made annually. This introduces variability  in volumes and income, but adds
to the long-run sustainability of the program.
Monitoring
The success of emission reducing programs can only be established through monitoring
and reporting.  The US Acid Rain program's emission permit trading component is widely viewed
as a successful way of lowering costs and enabling emission  reductions.  Initially, many in the press
and the environmental community were skeptical. Monitoring results established the positive
environmental effects of the program early and falling permit prices gave evidence to lower-than-
expected costs.
Monitoring can be difficult and expensive. The US Acid Rain program and the RECLAIM
program rely on continuous monitoring devices or frequent inspections. Moreover, successful
monitoring programs, like the Acid Rain program, have to date concentrated on large fixed
polluters. Monitoring multiple, moving fishermen  has proved more difficult. In New Zealand, the
government employs satellite pictures, informants, and on-board inspectors.
11Quality control and dispute resolution
In commodity markets, the desire for long-standing business encourages firms to manage
quality-- that is, to make certain the product they sell is the product they claim it is.  Carbon
credits however derive their value through the certification process, so quality control issues
relating to certification become more crucial. Carbon credit buyers will insist on valid
certification, but may not directly care about the environmental impact of the project.  Establishing
who is responsible for the performance of the certifier will fundamentally affect the incentives for
quality control and also the riskiness of purchases.  As discussed later, this is potentially one
source of heterogeneity among credits.
Information about quality tends to be held asymmetrically  -- producers are more likely to
know about the quality of their product than buyers. However, establishing quality through
inspection, sampling or other means before contracting purchases is expensive and time
consuming. In addition, such procedures would preclude forward purchases.  As a result, industry
participants in most established commodity markets have worked out explicit rules to resolve
disputes concerning arbitration and compensation. Still, delays can prove costly even for parties
that eventually win arbitrated disputes.  To avoid delays, several organized futures exchanges, like
the Chicago Board of Trade, take on the responsibility  of guaranteeing quality and other
performance characteristics of its trading members. Buyers and sellers deal with the exchange, not
with each other, thereby eliminating  all counter-party risk. In turn, the exchange manages its own
exposure to performance risk through margin requirements and other techniques.  Given the right
conditions, private markets for performance risk in carbon credits may emerge as well.
Standardization, reporting and banking
In the carbon credit markets, as in all markets, both supply and demand will contain
elements of uncertainty. Credits may not be produced as expected, or delivered late.  The
expected need for credits may differ from actual need. Problems associated with surpluses or
shortfalls can be minimized  if markets are liquid; that is, if it is easy to buy and sell credits as the
need arises.
Standardizing, or homogenizing the credit has been crucial in other permit markets. For
example, the US SO 2 permit market is national and increasingly  liquid because emission permits
are distinguished only by vintage.  For some pollutants, location does matter and markets must be
segmented.  For example, the RECLAIM program distinguishes  between in-land and coastal
sources since these have different smog-generated characteristics. Carbon emissions do not have
local effects and are well suited for a global market. 22
The Kyoto protocol and other proposals23  appear to provide a mechanism for
standardizing credits. Under the Kyoto Protocol's  Article 12, the Conference of the Parties would
provide guidelines for establishing and verifying  joint implementation reductions and designate
"operational" entities to certify the reductions.  Once certified, acquired credits can be used to
"cassist  in achieving compliance in the first commitment period."  Potentially, this mechanisms can
It should  be pointed out  that climate  control  agreements  don't necessarily  have  to standardize  credits  for  markets  to function
effectively.  In many  markets,  intermediating  instruments  frequently  emerge  to combine  heterogerieous  goods  into  a more
homogeneous  product. For example,  debt from  thousands  of individual  credit  card accounts,  assets  from a bank's
perspective,  are often  pooled and sold on secondary  markets. Even  heterogeneous  real estate assets can  be bundled  -
often  in dividend-paying  trusts - and sold on security  markets.
23 For example,  see tlNCTAD,  1996.
12jointly perform two key functions to facilitate secondary markets.  The process can standardize
credits through the certification process, and can also establish a reporting mechanism  that reduces
trades in bogus certificates, and provides valuable market information to buyers and sellers.
Lessons from the US SO 2 and earlier lead phase out programs are relevant.  The US EPA
had little experience in permit trading when the lead program was launched. EPA failed to provide
a certification mechanism for created surplus allowances and some refiners produced bogus
allowances for sale as prices rose.  Computer systems were inadequate as the number of gasoline
blenders rose.  The EPA faced a backlog in reviewing reported lead rights data and tracking
potential violators proved labor intensive. When the more ambitious Acid Rain SO2 trading
program was launched, extensive resources were put into the registration of trades through the
EPA's  Allowance Tracking System (ATS). Under the program, there are no restrictions on who
can buy and sell allowances; however trades must be registered ex post with the EPA by
authorized representatives. Firms can designate their own representative directly, or trade through
a broker. An average trade registration is completed in 30 minutes and all trades are registered
within 24 hours. Moreover, the trading data are made available to the public through a Web site.
Similarly,  in California SCAQMD set up a computer bulletin  board for posting trade requests for
the RECLAIM program.
The ATS system brings several benefits to the secondary market.  First it makes available
to the public past allocations and trades of permits in a transparent way, generating confidence and
easing the task of establishing ownership. Second, it provides the market place with information
on trading volumes in a timely fashion, allowing participants to judge liquidity.
Inventories can provide an additional inter-temporal liquidity  to markets.  The relationship
between market prices and storage is well studied in commodity markets and experiences in
commodity markets have been repeated in recent permit trading schemes that allow users to save
or "bank" permits 24. Inventories of permits can be held to meet unanticipated needs and
inventories allow users to smooth anticipated price changes. Analysts of permit markets have not
always appreciated this fact. For example, early simulations of the RECLAIM program in the LA
basin anticipated sharply rising permnit  prices as emission limits grew more stringent. The program
allowed banking however, and firms chose to purchase and hold early vintage permits for future
use.  Similar experiences were recorded in the US lead phasedown program and the US SO 2
permit market.
A secondary positive benefit of "banking" permits in cap-and-trade systems is that the
practice tends to encourage early reductions.  As noted earlier, emission bindings tend to start lax
and tighten over time.  Anticipating higher future permit prices, firms tend to purchase and hold
permits of an early vintage for future use.  Consequently, emission reductions take place earlier
than required.  Since the permits are used later, total reductions over time are unchanged;
however, when the effects of pollution are cumulative, the net effect can be positive for the
environment.
Destination market sovereign risks.
As discussed earlier, domestic policies shape the markets and incentives for using credits.
Firms with domestic obligations to reduce emissions have few choices to offset risks associated
24  For examples  from conmmodity  markets,  see  Working  (1934),  Williams  and Wright  (1991)  and Larson  (1994).
13with changes  in obligations  or policies  specifying  the manner  in which  the obligations  can be met.
Still,  policy  makers  can take steps  to implement  domestic  policies  to mitigate  risks  to domestic
firms  by adopting  clear policies  that cover  a period consistent  with long-term  investment  decisions.
Examples  of such  policies  include  the RECLAIM  and SO 2 programs. A different  approach  with
the same  goal in mind  is taken in the case  of the Dutch Covenants  and similar  voluntary
agreements  in Denmark  and Germany,  where obligated  firms  have  a measure  of control in
collectively  establish  how program  goals  are accomplished.
Many firms,  especially  those engaged  in power  generations  are subject  to regulatory
oversight  by local,  state and federal  authorities. Sometimes  this can create an overlapping  and
complicated  set of incentives  that work in unexpected  ways. In the US, economists  have  argued
that the way  electricity  rates are set by regional  commissions  creates  incentives  for capital-
intensive  rather than cost-minimizing  solutions  to S02 emissions.  In other examples  taken from
the US S02 program,  additional  requirements  by local  authorities  to use domestic  coal or to use a
particular  technology  has also reduced  the cost-savings  to firms  from the federal  emission-trading
program. Policy  makers  need to be vigilant  in order  to guard against  counter-productive
regulation.
As with the general  agreement,  domestic  policy  makers  also need  to consider  how  markets
related  to carbon  credits  may  evolve. This  is especially  important  in countries  where  the power
sector is undergoing  privatization  and electricity  markets  are opened  to competition.  Cap-and-
trade programs  like  the US SO 2 markets  function  well as national  electricity  markets  are
deregulated. In the absence  of additional  regional  regulations,  the cost of acquiring  the right  to
emit SO 2 is uniform  nationally  so the program  does not generate  artificially  incentives  to produce
electricity  in a particular  location. At the same  time,  it does  encourage  the use of production
technologies  that reduce or eliminate  SO 2 emissions.  Opening  the US market to international
markets  for electricity  however  would  require  a modification  of the program  -- for example  a
requirement  that electricity  imports  be matched  with emission  permits.
Host country risks
As mentioned  earlier,  investors  face a set of risks  stemming  from the policies  of the
country  hosting  the joint implementation  project. Sometimes,  the risks  can originate  with earlier
bilateral  or multilateral  agreements. 25 Still,  such risks  are not unique  to joint implementation
projects,  and risk management  lessons  can be drawn  from other  types of investment.
Pooling and risk sharing
A number  of smaller  scale  investments  can be pooled  to limit  the effect  of policy  changes  in
a single  country  on overall  returns. Large companies,  for example  Enron in energy  or Tate and
Lyle  in sugar,  have multiple  investments  in many  countries  creating  a portfolio  of projects  with
different  country  risks on their own company  balance  sheet. Smaller  investors  may  choose  to
participate  through a mutual  fund, for example  buying  into a pool of commercial  loans. Portfolio
managers  may actively  manage  the fund on behalf  of investors. Companies,  especially  commercial
banks,  may  choose  to share  risks  though project financing.  Under such arrangement  a lead  bank
will put together financing  from many  institutions  to fund a single  large project.
25For example,  Finland  was  unable  to apply  a carbon-tax  to imported  energy  because  of EU free-trade  agreements.
14Sovereign  risk insurance
Certain  types  of policy  risks,  for example  appropriation  or currency  convertibility  can be
insured. Providers  include  private sector  companies  such as Lloyds  of London,  American
Insurance  Group and Citicorp  International  Trade Indemnity.  Many countries  will also  provide
credit and political  risk  insurance  for exporters. Examples  include  HERMES  in Germany,  the US
Export-Import  Bank and  MITI in Japan. Multilateral  development  agencies,  including  the World
Bank Group,  the European  Bank for Reconstruction  and  Development,  and  the Inter-American
Development  Bank also provide  varying  degrees  of coverage. However,  insurance  against  policy
changes  is rare. A few government  agencies  offer comprehensive  insurance  that would  cover
losses regardless  of cause,  but this type of insurance  is not accessible  to most investors. The
World  Bank offers  coverage  against  a pre-defined  list of government  actions,  but will only  do so
with host government  participation.
Project risks
Handling  project  risk is standard  fair for the international  investment  community.  Pooling
and risk-sharing  methods  that apply  to country  risk  also apply  to project risks. In addition,
investors  undertake  a variety  of precautionary  actions  collectively  referred  to as due diligence.
Engineers,  accountants  and market  experts  are frequently  consulted  to limit  risks associated  with
the project. While  carbon  credit  markets  have  yet to fully  emerge,  many  of the underlying
technical  skills  in engineering,  permit  trading  and project evaluation  exist in either  related  markets
- for example,  regional  markets  for emission  reduction  credits  in the United  States-or  from
experience  gained  under  experimental  joint implementation  programs.
Price risks and secondary  markets
Prices  may  be volatile  for the underlying  product of a joint implementation  - for example
the price of electricity  - as well  as the price  of the credit itself Markets  for handling  price  risk
associated  with currencies,  interest  rates and a variety  of commodity  markets  have  emerged. In
the case of SO 2 permit  markets,  the Chicago  Board of Trade announced  plans  to launch  a futures
contract  and over-the-counter  option markets  have emerged. In California,  two private  firms
broker many  of the RECLAIM  trades.
As argued  earlier,  the need  for secondary  markets  and the volume  of trades  will be
determined  by a combination  of policies. In the Kyoto  Protocol, the Clean  Development
Mechanism  can play  an important  role in homogenizing  credits. Such standardization  will
facilitate  liquid  and low-transaction  cost markets. Still,  domestic  policies  will also determine  final
demand  for credits,  as well  as the demand  for related  risk  management  and derivative  products.
Price risk  management  is especially  relevant  under  cap-and-trade  schemes  and for joint
implementation  projects  that sell credits  into volatile  markets. Several  relevant  lessons  can be
drawn  from other tradable  permit  markets.
First, the market  for a stream  of credits  is different  from  the market  for credits. An
analogy  can be drawn  from the New Zealand  fish  quota market. There, fisherman  distinguish
between  the rights  to a portion of this year's catch  and the right  to annually  receive  a share  of the
annual  catch. Originally,  policy  makers  did  not directly  address  this distinction,  although  a market
solution  emerged  through  leasing  arrangements.  Likewise,  host countries  will do well  ensure  that
15local rules and regulations facilitate both the market for credits and the market for credit-
generating assets.
Second, information used to track credit trades is valued by market participants and is an
important component of transaction costs.  The SO 2 ATS system is one good example of how
govermments  can facilitate secondary markets by quickly disseminating  information. Moreover,
studies of both the RECLAIM and SO 2 programs show that transaction costs fall as information
about credit trades - especially price information  - becomes available to market participants.
Third, private markets will emerge to facilitate trade.  Indeed, in the case of the SO 2
program, poor design of the auction mechanism and the omission of pricing information in the
ATS system left market participants scrambling for ways of pricing their trades.  Private brokers
emerged who now provide pricing information publicly via the Internet and who provide price-risk
management instruments.
Summary  results
Experience from other tradable permit schemes demonstrates that programs can be
successful in internalizing externalities and motivating investment. Where appropriate, "banking"
provisions can provide early reductions in emissions and stabilize prices. By setting firm goals, by
enabling credit trading, and by providing a mechanism  to certify and track emission reduction units
generated through joint implementation, the Kyoto Protocol can potentially provide key elements
to a successful program and an active secondary market.  As with all tradable permit schemes, the
institutions charged with enforcing and monitoring the program will in large part determine the
success of the program.
Technical issues relating to baselining will prove especially  difficult to resolve, especially
where host countries do not face emission  limits, and will constitute an unusual type of risk.  Still,
many of the other market risks associated with project development or host country risk are not
significantly  different from risks managed in other economic endeavors. Further, in several of the
tradable permit programs active secondary markets have evolved to facilitate risk management.
Pooling, due diligence, insurance and price-risk instruments are all relevant solutions to some of
the risks faced by investors.
The larger issue facing investors relates to the political economy of the agreement.
Lessons from failed commodity agreements and an unpopular fish quota program in Iceland point
to the need to include all important stakeholders. Bringing developing countries into the
agreement in a way that is beneficial to all participants will be important to the long-term success
of the program
Experience from air-quality programs demonstrates that layers of regulation and varying
incentives can work at cross-purposes and raise the cost of abatement -- even under cap-and-trade
regimes. Companies surveyed expect future domestic regimes to reflect current regimes that differ
substantially among countries. As countries move to implement the provisions of the Kyoto
Agreement, policy makers should bear in mind that a patchwork of national policies or framework
arrangements that fragment markets and create dissimilar incentives will: 1) increase the cost of
global emission reductions; 2) generate leakages, inefficient resource use and other trade-related
distortions; and 3) eventually erode support for the framework agreement.
16Figure 1: Marketing chain for carbon credits
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Figure 3: Carbon-tax and the domestic  credit market.
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Table 1: Pricing features of alternative policies affecting  the use of carbon credits.
System  domestic and  domestic price  private incentives for JI
international price  volatility
equal
Cap-and-trade  yes  yes  yes
Carbon tax
unlimited substitution  maybe'  maybe'  maybe'
limited substitution  no  no  maybe'
Command-and-control  no  maybe?  mybe 2
'when the cost  of carbon  credits  is less  than the carbon  tax.
2 several  possible  outcomes.
Table 2: Likely sources of risk in the carbon credit market, by category.
private performance risk  price risk  sovereign or policy risk
host  intemational  destination  host  intemational  destnation  host  intenational  destination
Project preparation  x  x  x  x
Project life
economic performance  x  x  x  x  x
emission performance
Validation  x  x  x  x
Accreditation  x  x  x  x
Secondary markets  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x
Destination  market  x  x  x  x  x
19M. A SURVEY  OF  KEY ACTORS
Introduction
Selected policy makers and potential market participants were surveyed from November
1997 to February 1998 about their expectations concerning future carbon credit markets, the
policies that might shape those markets and the risks associated with participating in carbon credit
markets.  This section of the paper discusses the results of that survey.  The core survey group
includes companies and governments that expressed a written interest in the World Bank's
proposed Prototype Carbon Fund, but also includes other potential users of carbon-credit
instruments-- for example, companies and business associations active on JI issues. Many of the
organizations, both private and government, are in the forefront of the JI and carbon trading issues
and will be market shapers and leaders.
The survey revealed viewpoints that are in flux.  All organizations contacted stressed they
were in the early stages of the planning greenhouse gas strategies and that many unresolved policy
issues would influence future actions. Principle uncertainties mentioned were the lack of
framework conditions at the international, regional and country levels unresolved technical
questions such as project baseline determination procedures.  Consequently, future events could




The survey targeted individuals familiar with greenhouse gas issues who also play a role in
determining climate change strategy on behalf of their organization. The entities selected included
many potential participants in the World Bank's Prototype Carbon Fund; companies and
organizations that had made public statements concerning greenhouse gas issues; and others active
in the policy debate.  As a result, the respondents constitute a small focus group of knowledgeable
and interested parties rather than a scientific sample of opinion.
Almost all respondents reported holding internal discussions concerning greenhouse gas
issues. In addition, respondents working for organization which are large emitters of greenhouse
gases reported that their organization had made attempts to quantify those emissions 26. Of that
group, some had also attempted preliminary estimates of abatement costs.  One of the companies
had begun developing an internal simulation on carbon trading.  The respondents' awareness of
joint implementation issues was high.  Several had attended the Kyoto conference and several
were participating in joint implementation activities. Nevertheless, the respondents conveyed a
strong sense that the international and domestic policies related to joint implementation and
carbon-credit markets were still evolving. By implication, the respondents' views toward
anticipated markets and perceived risks are evolving as well.
26 Generally,  the estimates  were for carbon  emissions  from fuel  consumption.
20The sample comprises eighteen European companies and business federations; five North
American companies; five European governments; two European non-government organizations;
and one Japanese utility. Most of the companies surveyed are major emitters of greenhouse gases
(mainly carbon dioxide) and several are large, energy companies. The energy companies include
major international integrated energy companies, electricity producers, and gas transmission and
distribution companies. After energy companies, large industrial companies-- mostly large
construction and metal producers - were the largest cohort. Business federations active on behalf
of their membership on environmental matters were included as well.  A small number of financial
service companies -- primarily insurers and brokers-- and renewable energy producers were
surveyed as well. Five European governments were surveyed, all of which have indicated interest
in the World Bank's Prototype Carbon Fund.  Therefore the government respondents represents a
somewhat self-selecting group active in the climate change debate that see joint implementation as
potentially useful.
Structure of the questionnaire
The questionnaire consisted 21 questions organized into six sets.  Some questions had
multiple sections so that the total number of possible responses was 40.27  The first section of the
questionnaire asked the respondent about her: knowledge of greenhouse gas issues, views about
policy regimes, and perception of the role ofjoint implementation. The second and principal
section focused on the perception of the risks involved in the joint implementation process and
subsequent secondary markets.  The risks were subdivided into project risk associated with 1)
changes in regimes that could impact the transfer or value of the project's carbon credits and 2)
the project's technical and cost performance in reducing greenhouse gas emissions and risks
associated with the structure, liquidity, and transparency of markets for carbon credits and carbon-
based instruments.  A final section looked at the potential role of a carbon fund in mitigating
perceived project and market risks.  To allow comparability  between respondents, the questions
could generally  be answered by yes or no; or by ranking (very high, high, medium, and low.)  A
few questions required other responses such as geographical preference for joint implementation.
Domestic  greenhouse  gas  regimes
In this context, domestic regimes are the policies adopted by Annex 1 countries that
determine how carbon credits can be used.  Respondents were asked to rank the likelihood  of the
three domestic policy regimes described in Section I.  The choices were not exclusive, since a
country can have a mix of measures and an organization can operate in multiple countries, facing
multiple regimes.
Of the three potential regimes, European28  companies" ranked the regulation and carbon
tax regimes as most likely. Indeed these two approaches seemed linked, with companies believing
that domestic regimes could well include both types of measures in its greenhouse gas policies.
(Figure 5) In interviews, almost all European companies were familiar with the US sulfur dioxide
emission  trading program and found the results significant. Nevertheless very few European
27 A copy of the survey instrument is available from the authors.
28 In all cases, the grouping on European companies includes the response of one Japanese utility.
29
Unless stated otherwise, companies also includes business organizations.
21companies  thought  cap-and-trade  regimes  had a high chance  of being  a major component  of
European  emissions  policy.
Contrary  to the European  responses,  the North American  companies  ranked  cap-and-trade
as the most likely  option followed  by regulatory. Carbon  taxes  were considered  the least  likely.
Such  a response  seems  in line  with the existing  North American  environmental  and regulatory
context  that has traditionally  relied  on strong  regulatory  regimes  but has recently  moved  more  to
economic  instruments  such  as cap-and-trade.  The European  companies  that thought  cap-and  -
trade could  play  a major role, almost  all were UK based  which  perhaps  share  a view more similar
to those in North America.
Despite  variances  in the type of regime,  most companies  believed  that they  would  be
required  to take direct action  due to greenhouse  gas policies  and measures. Among  the European
countries,  a widespread  view  was that voluntary  agreements  would  be a major means  of
coordinating  and  implementing  greenhouse  gas reductions. This  view is also based  on the
prevalent  use of such  agreements  in Europe. Interestingly,  while  lacking  a history  of voluntary
agreements,  some  North American  companies  also viewed  such  agreements  as useful  in the carbon
reduction  context.
Generally  however,  companies,  regardless  of location,  expected  the government  policy
makers  to continue  current  approaches. Consequently,  to some  degree  the fact that many
companies  covered  by the survey  anticipate  carbon-tax  and regulatory  approaches  reflects  the
composition  of the survey  sample.
European government responses
Interestingly, European governments appear more willing to utilize market-based tools
(carbon  taxes and cap-and-trade)  than  European  companies  believe  them to be. For example,  EU
governments  ranked  regulatory  regimes  as a low  to medium  option as opposed  to the much  higher
probability  assigned  by companies.  Further several  companies  headquartered  and with major
operations  in one country  ranked  the probability  of a regulatory  regime  as high  while  the
government  itself  ranked  it as low.
On cap-and-trade  regimes,  governments  also  gave  this a higher  probability  than  companies
by and large did. Governments  generally  stated that such  a measure  was possible  -- presumably  as
a part of an integrated  policy. Again  companies  located  in that country,  gave  this option a lower
probability  than the government,  itself. The governments  viewed  the probability  of carbon  taxes as
high,  but then again several  of the governments  surveyed  already  have such  taxes. Therefore
expanding  this result  to countries  without  current  carbon  taxes  could show  a different  result All
governments surveyed saw a role for voluntary agreements in the implementation of domestic
regimes.
Utilization of joint implementation
Overview
All  large carbon  emitters  surveyed  expressed  a willingness  to use joint implementation.
Indeed in interviews, some expressed a belief that joint implementation  would be a major tool for
22achieving  greenhouse gas reductions.  The questionnaire offered four approaches to joint
implementation:
*  generate credits with self-managed  projects internal to the organization-- that is, using carbon
reductions in company operations in one country to offset domestic carbon requirements in
another; 30
*  manage new projects with independent host-country partners;
*  actively managed a pool of joint implementation  projects backed by multiple participants and;
*  passively invest in joint implementation projects managed by others.
Company responses
Companies showed a clear preference for directly managing their joint implementation
investments.  (Figure 6).  This preference cut across company types, with the only exceptions
being some domestic electrical utilities. The first approach -- internal  joint implementation
projects-- was the overwhelming favorite of those companies with significant  international
operations.  All such companies ranked this option as high or very high.  In interviews, these
companies saw clear economic and operational advantages to such a strategy.  The economic
benefits from joint implementation often result in energy efficiency  improvements that the
company believed would yield economic benefits for its own operations. 3'  Operationally the large
international companies saw internal  joint implementation projects as relatively similar to existing
operations and could be integrated into current capital investment strategies. Monitoring of
internal  joint implementation projects was also thought to be easier.
Large, international companies that ranked the first approach highly, clearly preferred it to
the other options.  Related to this, in interviews some companies often expressed a clear
preference to controlling the joint implementation projects.  This viewpoint is not surprising given
the large size of these companies that are clearly  used to running their own operations.  In
contrast, large companies whose operations are primarily  in one country (generally domestic
utilities), by necessity, ranked internally managed projects much lower since they lack the
international operations to implement this option.
Several of the companies showed a geographical preference for joint implementation
projects relatively close to their existing operations.  The more international the operations of a
company, the more global their geographical interest.
European government  respondents
In general, governments showed more uncertainty as to ranking these options and often
responded that they were still discussing how to implement  joint implementation. They were more
positive about being passive participants in a portfolio; reflecting their more limited operational
capacity. An issue frequently cited was that until EU policy was clarified, domestic joint
implementation policy could not fully evolve for member countries.  Geographically, several of the
governments cited a preference for Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltic.  Given the location
30 Given  the nature of govenment options,  the first option  was  modified  to "concentrating  on  projects  sponsored  by domestic
corporations."
31 These  economic  benefits  would  presumably  be less than the cost of the JI investment,  and thus would  be implemented  only
with the financial  benefits  of carbon  credits. However  the definition  of additionality  is still undecided.
23of the respondent countries, this preference indicates a desire to pursue joint implementation
projects in nearby countries.
Performance and sovereign risk
A distinction was made between performance and sovereign risks in order to separate the
technical risks from the policy changes that can impact carbon credits. Both of these types of risks
can influence  joint implementation investment decisions by affecting the risk premium required for
investment and the discount value-- especially  if risks are believed to change over time.
Project risks
Project risk has two basic components: the ability  of a joint implementation project to meet
the projected improvement in carbon emissions and the accuracy of the technical cost estimates.
Additional risks concern the over-time performance of the facility and the acceptability of
monitoring and verification procedures.
The cost parameters are primarily the initial investment and the operating costs.  Variations
from planned carbon reductions directly impact the cost/ton.  Further joint implementation projects
based on switching to less carbon intensive fuels (e.g. coal to gas) are exposed to changes in fuel
prices affecting the competitive advantage and thus the project's financial status.
European companies rated the risks of both achieving  the greenhouse gas targets and the
cost per ton to have, on average, slightly above medium risk. (Figure 7)  Perhaps reflecting their
linkage, both the emissions and cost variables were considered to have about the same level of
risks. Companies with primarily domestic operations tended to consider the risks higher than
international companies.  This could be a response to their overall lack of experience in
international projects, rather than the joint implementation nature of the project.  In interviews
with companies, this risk was generally not thought to be substantial.  The five North American
companies saw these risks at approximately the same level as the European companies. However
a substantial difference exists between the North American financial companies that tended to view
these risks in the low to medium range, while the energy companies rated them in the high range.
Governments were often uncertain as to the risks - perhaps because they are not traditional
international investors.  Even with countries with substantial  joint implementation experience,
there was wide disparity of the perception of risk related to greenhouse gas reductions and costs.
Other countries reported they had too little information  to respond or that the issue was too
project specific for generalization.
Sovereign risks
Company respondents
Changes in host government regimes (where the JI project is located) were considered the
greatest risk, and indeed, the highest single risk by companies in the entire survey. (Figure 8)
Both large and small as well as international and domestic based companies ranked this as high to
very high risk.  Even companies that presumably could mitigate such risk, for example
international companies with a preference for internal  joint implementation projects, still
considered the risk high.  In interviews, when the issue ofjoint implementation investments was
24discussed in terms of how investments would probably concentrate in countries with a perceived
lower sovereign risk, interviewees, while agreeing to this, still found the risk high.
Domestic govemment risk (where the carbon credits are utilized) was perceived as much
lower, albeit about one third still found the risk high.  In interviews, the risk associated with
domestic regimes was less one of changes once the regime was in place; but uncertainty as to the
design of the policy itself. This uncertainty was further accented by how EU policy would affect
domestic policy. Consequently, a distinction should be made between the risks associated with
host governments where detrimental changes in regimes were considered possible, and domestic
regimes were the risk was tied more to the uncertainty of the regime's initial design.
The level of risks associated with international accords fell between that of host and
domestic regimes. On an overall basis, the risks associated with the international accords were
relatively high, and associated with the lack of definition  of many of the joint implementation
issues.  For example, several companies mentioned their confusion concerning the "clean
development mechanism" introduced in Kyoto.
European and North American companies responses were quite similar in ranking host
government risk higher than that of the domestic government.  However, North American
companies viewed the risks associated with international accords much higher than their European
counterparts.
European government respondents
Interestingly governments rated sovereign risk much lower than companies. Even host
government risk was considered low to medium -- albeit one stated this was done by carefully
selecting the host country.  One qualification  made by two governments was that Annex 1
countries represented lower risk than non-Annex 1, especially given the uncertainties of the "clean
development mechanism." Not surprisingly, domestic govemments rated domestic government
risks as low.  Legal restrictions were mentioned as limiting changes in polices and measures. The
main issue was thought to be uncertainty as to the shape of domestic policies and not changes in
policies. International accords were perceived as having a greater sovereign risk than the other
two categories. Here again the risk revolved around the number of uncertainties that still need to
be resolved by negotiation.
Monitoring,  validation  and certification
At both the project and sovereign level, risk is associated with the monitoring, validation
and certification of carbon credits.  At the project level, poor or improper monitoring could lead to
doubts as to the amount and quality of carbon credits generated by a joint implementation project.
At the sovereign level, an accepted and transparent method of certifying credits is needed to assure
their bilateral and international acceptance.  The monitoring issue involves the determination of a
baseline as well as the monitoring of actual emission levels from the joint implementation project.
Several respondents brought up the baseline issue, and one respondent found it the most
important issue in the joint implementation debate.  As validation and certification has not been
addressed by the conventions, how and under whose authority this will occur continues to be a
major uncertainty.
25Companies  gave the monitoring  and  validation  issues  one of the highest  levels  of risk  in the
entire survey. This high ranking  was given  across  the range of companies. (Figure  9)
Governments  as well assigned  very high  to medium  risk levels  for this category.
Sesnedary markets
(Jverwdew
lBoth  companies  and govermments  almost  universally  recognized  the utility  of a secondary
market. Indeed  some  companies  considered  it essential  and doubted  that carbon  credits  could  fully
develop  without  it. The major uncertainty  was the timing  of the market's development  with several
respondents  thinking  it could  take several  years. Some  entities  thought  that a secondary  market  in
the US was more  likely  than in Europe. Companies  generally  believed  that domestic  governments
would  introduce  policies  to support  the development  of a secondary  market.
In stark contrast,  only  one government  thought  domestic  policy  support  for secondary
markets  was very probable;  others  thought  it too early  to predict  such a choice. Governments
were also attuned  to the need  to balance  policies  and brought  up concerns  about need  to
harmonize  with other actors and the need  for policies  to encourage  domestic  physical  reductions
as well  as trading  in credits.
The differences  between  government  and company  approaches  to the secondary  market
were also shown  by the interest  in futures  markets  and reserve  prices and auctions. While  most
companies  expect  futures and options' markets  to develop  (albeit  with differences  on when)
govemrnments  seem  less certain  this will occur. Further on the issue of reserve  prices or auctions  to
reduce  some  of the secondary  market  risks, companies  were generally  negative  or indifferent  while
govermments  generally  saw them as useful.
Types of market risk
Secondary  market risk  was divided  into seven  categories  dealing  with market structure,
price  information,  and liquidity. Respondents  ranked  these  categories  as to very high,  high,
medium  and low. The specific  categories  were:
e  heterogeneity  (differences)  among  carbon  credits  as to their  perceived  risk and trading
characteristics;
*  the lack, especially  in the beginning,  of an organized  market  for carbon  credits;
@  counterparty  risks  associated  with the buyer  or seller's  ability  or willingness  to fulfill  their
commitment;
*  limited  price  information  on market  trades;
s  dominance  of the market  by a few players;
c  limited  number  of market  participants;
*  low market  liquidity.
European  company respondents
Companies ranked the possibility of heterogeneity among carbon credits as the greatest
market  risk. Almost  two thirds of companies  rated this risk either  very high or high,  and was the
26only question in the survey that no company ranked as low risk. 32 (Figure 10) Several companies
mentioned the clean development mechanism as already implying  a difference between Annex 1
and non-Annex 1 carbon credits.
A related issue is the bilateral certification of carbon credits between the host and domestic
governments which presumably requires that carbon credits for any specific joint implementation
project be traded only within the signatory domestic country.  Such a condition reduces the size of
the secondary market by limiting the area in which any specific certificate can trade.
Companies rated the lack of an organized market as the second highest risk.  Half of all
companies ranked this a high to very high risk while a third ranked it as medium risk.  This
concern is linked to the belief that most companies see a secondary market as key to the trading of
carbon credits and thus its absence would be a major barrier to trading.  It should be noted,
however, that several of the larger companies ranked this risk as low in that they were confident
that such a market would develop if needed.
While the remaining  five categories received fewer rankings of high risks, all except one
were considered to have substantial risk. Counter party risk was considered substantial. One third
of companies ranked this as very high to high risk and more than a third as medium. The counter
party risks were seen to be related to potential changes by host countries and the long-term nature
of joint implementation projects that could increase the risk of future delivery of carbon credits.
The remaining  four categories can be viewed as relating to the viability of the market itself
- specifically if the market will attract enough players and trading to provide sufficient price
information and trading depth.  Limitedprice  information and market dominance were considered
a high risk by one third of companies. These two categories are closely linked in that market
dominance by a few players could be seen as reducing price transparency.  Almost all companies
that ranked market dominance as a high risk also linked price information as a high risk as well.
The converse was also true that companies that considered one a low risk considered the other
low as well.
The risk categories of lack of liquidity and the number ofparticipants  were also linked by
companies, albeit not as closely as price information and market dominance. The relation between
liquidity and number of participants is intuitively obvious and most companies tended to rank their
risk equally. In some cases the risk diverged.  One company thought that there could be a high
number of participants but still that liquidity  would be determined, and perhaps limited, by a few
large players.
One important point is that companies had different types of risk profiles overall -- i.e.
companies tended to either rank most of the seven risk categories as low or as high. Only a few
companies had significant variances among responses. Interestingly these variations in risk profiles
do not appear to be particularly related to either company size or sector.
North American  company respondents
North American companies also found the secondary market risks substantial, and the
general risk profile was broadly similar. Lack of liquidity and heterogeneity of the credits was
considered the highest risks followed by lack of an organized market and counterparty risks.
32 This risk was also  reflected in the high  risk that companies  gave  to the monitoring  and certifying  carbon  credits.
27Energy  companies  seem  to have  consistent  risk profiles  across  the categories  - i.e.
assigning  all categories  the same  level  of risk. This  was not true of the financial  companies  that
saw differences  in risk across  the categories. Notably,  the energy  company  that saw the highest
secondary  market  risk, also stated that its preference  for bilateral  and lateral  trades, thus avoiding
the market  to the extent possible.
European government respondents
The five  governments  surveyed  ranked  the secondary  market risks  much  higher  than
companies  did. Indeed  higher  risk was perceived  across  all seven  categories,  except  curiously,  the
companies  concern  about  the heterogeneity  of credits  (their  highest  risk)  was ranked  lower by
governments.  While  the small  size of the sample  makes generalization  difficult,  the risk  levels
showed  little  variation. All seven  categories  received  rankings  between  high and medium  and no
country  ranked  the risks as low. One  country  did not feel  it had sufficient  information  to rank
most of the risks.
One reading  of this result  is that while  some  European  governments  see secondary  markets
as useful  and desirable,  they also  perceive  them as carrying  substantial  risks. Such an implication
could have  an impact  on the evolution  of domestic  regulation  of secondary  carbon  markets.
Carbon  funds
Overview
In this section,  respondents  were asked  whether  a managed  pool of carbon-based
investments  similar  to the proposed  World  Bank  Prototype  Carbon  Fund might  be used to
facilitate  markets  and offset  risks. Related  to a carbon  fund, five  potential  risk or cost-reducing
benefits  arising  from a fund were identified:
•  lower cost per ton of carbon  reductions
e  decreased  sovereign  risks
*  improved  tradability  of carbon  certificates
•  lower transaction costs
*  improved  price transparency.
Respondents  were asked  to rank them from very high  to low.
Company respondents
Concerning  risk minimization,  European  companies  saw a carbon  fund as having  the
highest  benefit  in reducing  sovereign  risks  and improving  tradability  of certificates;  moderate  use
in reducing  transaction  costs and  improving  price  transparency;  relatively  little  use in reducing  the
cost/ton of carbon  credits.
The mnitigation  of sovereign  and  tradability  risks  is particularly  significant  in that companies
ranked  these as the highest  risk variables. Among  the project  risk categories,  companies  ranked
host govemment  risk  the highest;  while  in the secondary  market  risk categories,  the highest  risk
ranking  was in trading  lirmitations  due to heterogeneity  among  carbon  credits. Therefore  European
companies  see a carbon  fund as positively  affecting  the two greatest  risk variables  identified  in the
28survey. In interviews,  sovereign  risk  was almost  always  identified  with the host country. Here a
multilateral  bank's lending  operations  and financial  presence  was viewed  as helping  to insure  that
joint implementation  agreements  would  be honored. Several  companies  believed  that, joint
implementation  projects  in some  countries  might  only  be possible  in conjunction  with a multilateral
institution. The tradability  and sovereign  risk issues  were connected  in that companies  generally
saw that the quality,  and thus tradability,  of the certificate  would  often  be based on the perceived
reliability  of the host government. Several  companies  suggested  that projects associated  with
international  development  banks  would  have a lower  risk  associated  with monitoring  and
certification.
The factor European  companies  judged  least  beneficial  had to do with final  costs.
Generally,  firms  believed  that a portfolio  ofjoint implementation  projects managed  by a
multilateral  lending  agency  would  be relatively  high  cost, and at best only marginally  less
expensive  than could  be identified  elsewhere. In interviews,  some  companies  suggested  that if
such  funds  were successful,  new entrants  could  emerge  with lower  cost/ton portfolios,  displacing
multilateral  investment  pools.
The North American  companies  were more skeptical  of a carbon  fund than  their  European
counterparts. While  some  companies  said  that such a fund  could have  positive  benefits,  especially
in the beginning,  one said  that the overall  effects  would  be negative. All but one of the companies
thought  that reducing  sovereign  risks  would  be the fund's largest  benefit. However  all  the other
categories  were ranked  less highly  than  by the Europeans,  and again  the perception  was that such
a fund would  be high cost on a per ton basis. Thus in general,  the North American  firms  sampled
saw fewer  benefits  to a fund than the European  firms.
European government respondents
Government  responses  varied  substantially  from companies  but showed  no consensus. On
the issues  that companies  found most important,  sovereign  risk and tradability,  governments  were
less clear. On sovereign  risks, two governments  found a carbon  fund to have a high  benefit;  but
three others found  it unclear. While  on tradability,  government  views of the benefits  ranged  from
high to low with two undecided. Transaction  cost benefits  were ranked  the highest  single
advantage  of a fund. Price transparency  was also thought  to be improved. Interestingly  some
governments  viewed  a carbon  fund as having  a cost/ton advantage. An interesting  observation  is
that all the governmental  respondents  have  expressed  interest  in participating  in a carbon  fund,  yet
they hold  very different  opinions  as to the advantages  of such a fund.
Summary  results
Greenhouse gas regimes and  joint  implementation options
Most respondents  expected  that future regimes  would  reflect  current environmental  and
industrial  regimes  existing  in their home countries. For example,  most European  respondents
tended  to think  that domestic  regimes  would  be based  on regulatory  and carbon  tax measures.
While  most were familiar  with the US model  for "cap and  trade" used to regulate  sulfur  dioxide
emissions,  most companies  did not think  it would  play  a major role. Interestingly,  European
governments  thought  "cap and trade" and carbon  tax regimes  more probable  than companies  did.
29North American companies expected "cap-and-trade" or regulatory schemes, but discounted the
probability of carbon taxes.
Almost all companies felt they would face future policies designed to limit carbon
emissions and wanted to use joint implementation to fulfill domestic carbon obligations.
Companies had a strong preference for implementing  joint implementation projects either within
their internal international operations, if available, or by directly investing in outside joint
implementation projects. Few companies preferred investing in managed "pools".  Governments
were much less certain both as to whether they would use joint implementation or the form it
would take.
Risks
For companies, two risks emerged as the most important: 1) the host country's ability and
willingness  to uphold the joint implementation agreements; and 2) the ability  to trade joint-
implementation-based carbon credits.  The risk associated with the host country had collateral
effects on other risk categories for example  monitoring, certification of carbon credits, and counter
party risks.  Several thought that tradability could be affected by the host country origin of the
credits.  The tradability concern included other issues such as certification of carbon credits,
liquidity of the market, different types of carbon certificates (for example if Annex 1 and non-
Annex 1 credits would be equivalent) and limitations on the trade of carbon credits between Annex
I governments. North American companies tended to have a greater belief than the Europeans
that secondary markets were essential for carbon credits and would develop.  European
governments tended to be less concerned about risks associated with host governments, but more
concemed about the risks associated with a secondary market.
Risks and a carbon fund
Opinions of companies were mixed as to the need and role of a carbon fund-type
instrument.  Large companies with international operations had a strong preference for
implementing  joint implementation projects directly and little interest in such a fund.  Companies
with primarily  domestic operations tended to prefer direct control of joint implementation projects
but had some interest in a fund type instrument.  Only a few companies, primarily domestic
utilities, believed that this type of instrument could be highly  useful. North American companies
were generally skeptical of the value of such a fund.  Almost all companies though that a carbon
fund would be high cost.  Governments were less decided on the benefits of a carbon fund but did
see some advantages concerning transaction costs and improved price transparency.
Still, a carbon fund was seen as reducing two of the secondary market risk that companies
found most problematic: host country and certificate tradability. Some otherwise skeptical
companies thought that working with an international finance institution might be useful in some
geographical areas.
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32IV.  CONCLUSIONS
Experience from other tradable permit schemes demonstrates that programs can be
successful in internalizing externalities and motivating investment. Where appropriate, "banking"
provisions can provide early reductions in emissions and stabilize prices. By setting firm goals, by
enabling credit trading, and by providing a mechanism to certify and track emission  reduction units
generated through joint implementation, the Kyoto Protocol can potentially provide key elements
to a successful program and an active secondary market.  As with all tradable permit schemes, the
institutions charged with enforcing and monitoring the program will be vital.
Technical issues relating to baselining  will prove especially difficult to resolve, especially
where host countries do not face emission limits. Still, many of the other market risks associated
with project development or host country risk are not significantly  different from risks managed in
other economic endeavors. Further, in several of the tradable permit programs active secondary
markets have evolved to facilitate risk management. Pooling, due diligence, insurance and price-
risk instruments are all relevant solutions to some of the risks faced by investors.
The larger issue facing investors relates to the political economy of the agreement.
Lessons from failed commodity agreements and an unpopular fish quota program in Iceland point
to the need to include all important stakeholders. Bringing developing countries into the
agreement in a way that is beneficial to all participants will be important to the long-term success
of the program.  Survey results suggests that companies and governments in North America and
Europe generally recognize joint implementation as key method of containing the costs of
greenhouse gas regulations. Further, secondary markets are also widely viewed as important. If
broadly based, these commonly held beliefs provide unifying  incentives to reach agreement.
Experience from air-quality programs demonstrates that layers of regulation and varying
incentives can work at cross-purposes and raise the cost of abatement -- even under cap-and-trade
regimes. Companies surveyed expect future domestic regimes to reflect current regimes that differ
substantially  among countries.  As countries move to implement the provisions of the Kyoto
Agreement, policy makers should bear in mind that a patchwork of national policies or framework
arrangements that fragment markets and create dissimilar incentives will: 1) increase the cost of
global emission reductions; 2) generate leakages, inefficient resource use and other trade-related
distortions; and 3) eventually erode support for the framework agreement.
Companies expect host-country regimes to differ and are suspicious that host governments
will intervene or reverse policies. Further, they worry that the institutional arrangements for
monitoring and baselining will be insufficient  to guarantee results.  Consequently, they expect
offsets to vary in quality and markets to be heterogeneous.  Institution-building and programs that
address sovereign risk could reduce these risks substantially. However, governments surveyed do
not view heterogeneity in offsets as a significant  risk and may not place priorities on institution
building.
Companies, where possible, would prefer to actively manage their own portfolio of offset
projects.  For surveyed companies, the primary benefit of a pooled carbon fund administered
through a multilateral development institution might lie in the ability  of the institution to address
issues related to policy risks and transparency in the processes of baselining, monitoring and
certification.  Such skills are likely to be most appreciated early on when information is scarce and
33precedents rare.  Host-country project managers may be drawn to a carbon fund for similar
reasons.
Way forward
The sustained release of greenhouse gases through human activity has uncertain, but
potentially severe global consequences.  Similarly  the cost of limiting emissions is potentially high.
Significant  changes in greenhouse gas emissions require broad-based changes in individual  action,
best and most efficiently achieved through broad-based changes in incentives. Policies that create
markets where participants face artificially  differentiated incentives  will raise the cost of limiting
greenhouse gases and erode support for, and effectiveness  of, the agreement.  Consequently,
domestic policy makers and participants in international agreements should seek ways to limit
market segmentation for carbon-credit based assets.
Experience from other tradable permit schemes shows that it is often helpful to distinguish
between on-going incentives and the welfare transfers associated with establishing the initial
conditions of the program -- for example, the incentive embodied with the price of an allowance,
compared to the value of an initial endowment of allowances. In the same way, policy makers
should try to distinguish  between issues of equity and bargaining, and issues of efficiency.
Since carbon credits are rooted in policy, the institutions charged with baselining,
monitoring, validation and certification of carbon credits are vital.  Surveyed firms view host
institutions as an important source of risk and will differentiate their investment among projects
based on the perceived ability of these institutions to perform. Efforts to design the institutions to
be efficient and reliable will lower the global costs of reducing greenhouse gasses.
These and related institutions can also play an important role in disseminating information
essential to markets.  Experience from other tradable permit schemes has shown that increased
information flows and evolving markets lower transaction costs and consequently the costs of
emission reductions.  Further, these markets form the bases for risk management instruments.
34ANNEX  I: CASE  STUDIES  IN TRADABLE  PERMrrs
1. Fish and individual tradable quotas: lessons from New Zealand, Iceland and
elsewhere
Background
An individual  transferable quota (ITQ) is a permanent right to land a specified percentage
of a total annual fish catch.  ITQs can be sold and are often leased as well.  ITQs are usually
season and species specific. New Zealand introduced the first major ITQ in 1986, but similar
programs operate in Australia, Canada, Iceland, Italy, the Netherlands, South Africa and the
United States.
The collapse of the Newfoundland cod fishery in the 1980s and the reduced size of other
fisheries brought about a variety of regulatory systems throughout the world aimed at achieving
sustainable harvests.  Open systems and systems that limited the fishing season led to a "race to
fish" and an over-capitalization of the industry as high-powered boats were employed to catch a
larger share of a dwindling catch.
Commercial fishing rights have traded in New Zealand since 1986.  The program was
devised as a way to address both the over-fishing  of New Zealand's in-shore fisheries and over-
capitalization of the New Zealand fleet.  Modification of the program are now underway.  The
program is generally considered successful, and has been much imitated around the world.
How the system works
Total Allowable Catch (TAC) limits are set annually  by the Minister of Fisheries after
consultation with stake holders --including sport fishermen and Maori customary fishers. The
legislation specifies  that the TAC must "move toward" a maximum sustainable yield -- providing
the New Zealand government substantial leeway in setting the overall total.  A portion of the TAC
is set aside for commercial fishing -- the Total Allowable Commercial Catch (TACC). ITQs
represent the permanent right to a specified share of the TACC.  ITQs are species specific;
however some minimum  levels of "by-catch" are allowed.
ITQs were allocated based on the best recorded catches in two of three historic fishing
years (1981-83).  A Quota Appeal Authority heard over 2,000 appeals of the initial quota
allocation and increased the allocation in about 1,000 cases.
ITQs are fully tradable with the following restrictions.  There is a maximum quota
ownership to prevent market power abuse.  There are minimum  quotas to limit administrative
costs.  Quota holders must be New Zealand residents, or companies that are 75% New Zealand.
ITQs in New Zealand can be "fished-against" or effectively leased. Beginning in 1998,
fishing rights will be further delineated between the permanent quota right (ITQ) and an Annual
Catch Entitlement (ACE) -- the annual tonnage implied  by the ITQ for any given year.  In 1998,
both units are tradable.  Borrowing and banking of tonnage were allowed, but these features were
eliminated in 1998.
35ITQs create an incentive  for fishermen  to both under-report  and "high-grade"  -- catch
more  than their quota and dump  lower  valued  fish. The  Ministry  of Fisheries  uses  physical
surveillance,  spot checks  and satellite  information  to enforce  ITQs.
Expectations and market prices
Early on, ITQs were a new kind of commodity.  Market  participants  were unfamiliar  with
the system  and may  have  also doubted  the permanence  of the program. Prices  for ITQs started
out fairly  low, but have increased  in recent  years. ITQs for abalone  trading  at NZ$ 49,500  per ton
in 1988/89,  but appreciated  to NZ$ 210,000  by 1994/95. Hoki ITQs increased  in a slightly  less
spectacular  fashion,  moving  from NZ$ 2,000 in 1988/89  to NZ$ 4,500 in 1994/95.
Currently,  most ITQs in New Zealand  are leased  rather than sold. This  unanticipated
market development  led to the formal  creation  of ACEs.
Lessons  from other systems
A number  of other countries  have  experimented  with similar  systems. Table  3 selectively
lists some  fishing  quota schemes. One common  variant  used in  British  Colombia,  Canada  and
Iceland  is to attach a fishing  quota to a specific  licensed  vessel. There have also been  variations  on
how the quota was allocated. For example,  the US wreckfish  quota  was based 50% on historic
catches,  and 50% on equal  shares. In Australia  initial  quotas  for bluefin  tuna were based  75% on
historic  catch and 25% on the value  of investment  in equipment.
Generally,  the programs  have  been  viewed  as successful  in limiting  the overall  catch  and  in
reducing  the capital  costs. The catch  is usually  brought  in more slowly  over a longer  period  with
fewer  boats.  However,  the systems  are not without  problems.  High-grading  and the costs of
monitoring  reporting  have already  been  mentioned. In Iceland,  it is argued  that the high  cost of
obtaining  a vessel  quota encourages  trawling  over line  fishing  with negative  environmental  impact.
A larger issue, central  to all quota allocation  schemes,  relates  to fairness. Communities
dependent  on fish  processing  feel  that they have  a stake in the industry,  but are usually  excluded
from the initial  allocation  of quotas. Further,  some  in Iceland  question  the morality  of permanently
allocating  fishing  rights  to individuals,  thereby  precluding  future  generations  from similar
opportunities.
Lessons  for tradable  permit markets
Early tradable  fish  quota programs  demonstrated  that "tragedy  of the commons"  problems
could  be solved  by privatizing  and distributing  shares  of a public  good and allowing  the market  to
subsequently  redistribute  a fixed  quota among  potential  users. Generally,  the programs  are viewed
as successful  and have influenced  subsequent  tradable  permit  schemes. The practical  experience  of
implementing  similar,  but not identical  programs  over a period of time in several  countries
provides  several  important  lessons.
The value of tradable  permits  is dependent  on the regulatory  institutions  that create  them.
Consequently,  the "rules of the game"  and their future stability  are key determinants  of the success
of such programs. The privatization  of a common  resource  and the early  use of tradable  quotas
was accepted  largely  because  spectacular  failures  of fisheries  elsewhere  drove fishermen  to look
36for a viable  solution. Tradable  quotas  were one of many  policy  experiments;  but the approach
gained  popularity  because  they  were viewed  as successful  and efficient.
By privatizing  a common  resource,  the fish-quota  programs  created  and conferred  wealth
to individuals.  Successful  programs  were inclusive  in the allocation  process. At the same  time,
the general  process  was shaped  by local and somewhat  arbitrary  views of fairness  and  in most
cases  ended in considerable  deal making  and  bargaining.
There are several  important  lessons  to be drawn  about  how tradable  permit  markets
evolve. The first  is that market participants  quickly  differentiated  between  the asset value of the
underlying  quota share,  and its seasonal  value. In New Zealand,  this resulted  in a formal
distinction  between  the permanent  quota right  and the annual  catch. Second,  it is difficult  to
initially  price tradable  quotas when the program  is established.  Uncertainty  about the program
itself  and the effects  of the program  combined  with new markets  for the quotas themselves
resulted  large price  movements  over time. Finally,  while  uncertainty  about the overall  size of the
annual  catch  probably  complicated  price forecasting,  functioning  markets  for both annual  quotas
and long-term  quota rights  did emerge.
37Table 3: Characteristics  of selected  tradable  fish quota  progams.
Country  ~Starting  Numnber  of  Markcet  share  Othe  3y-catc  Banking/
date'  species  restrictioms  restrictions  provisions  borrowing
covered
Austraia
tuna  1984  1
orange  roughy  1989  1  yesn3  yes
3'
1  no  no
South  Est fishery  1992  1635  yes  I  yes 
2 no  no
Canada
BC  halbut  1990  1  yes 3'  C3  no  no
Iceland
hering  1979  1  Yes 
38 yes
39  no  no
capelin  1986  1  yes
4 Yes  no  no
demerol  1990  1  Yes  nO  no
New  ZeJland  1986  33  yes 4 yesi"  Yes  yes,  currently
United  States"
clamn  & quahog  1990  2  no  yes' 2 no  no
wreckfish  1992  1  no  No  no  no
halibut  & sablefish  1995  2  yes  Yee'  no  no
2. Leaded  gas  phasedown
Background'
In the 1970s,  lead contained  in gasoline  was the primary  source of environmental  lead  in
the United  States. Lead is toxic to humans  and also  breaks  down the catalytic  converters  used to
reduce  automobile  emissions.  In 1973,  the US EPA launched  a  Lead Phasedown  Program,
designed  to reduce lead  content in gasoline  and  to create incentive  for refineries  to switch  to
producing  unleaded  gas. The 1973  regulation  set a maximum  average  lead content  for refined
gasoline. The average  allowed  pooling  of leaded  and non-leaded  gas production. By 1982,
unleaded  gasoline  was widely  available  and  EPA introduced  more stringent  controls. At the same
33rITQs  must be matched  with  licenses.
34 Zonal restrictions,  gear restrictions.
35Teorange  roughy  1TC  was subsumed  under the Southeast  fishery  1TQ  program  in 1992.
36Quotas  were linked  to vessels.
37 Transferability  was also limited  and phased.
38  Quotas  are allocated  to vessels,  not individuals. Vessel  entry  is limited by license.
39To  stabilize  local emnployment,  there  are restrictions  on trnmsferrng  quotas  out of the region.
4075%  domestic  ownership.
41  Regional  programs.
42 Noquota transfers during  the last two months  of the season.
43Restrictions  on leasing,  on transfer  between  vessel categories,  on transfer  between  management  areas  and  minimum  quota
size.
44This  section relies heavily on Lambert (1 996) and Hahn and Hester  (1 989).
38time, the program created rights to add specified quantities of lead to gasoline and permitted
trades in those rights among refineries.
The EPA objective was to reduce the lead content of a gallon of gasoline to less than 0.10
grams per leaded gallon (gplg) through a series of phased steps.  1982 limits were set at 1.10 gplg;
limits were set at 0.50 gplg on July 1, 1985. All refiners without extra allowances were expected
to reach 0.10 gplg by July 1986.
How the program worked
Starting in 1982, the EPA set the gplg standard at 1.10.  Small refiners were given a grace
period to meet the standard.  The program generated allowances to add specific amounts of lead,
which were award to refineries based on historic production levels. Refineries with excess
allowances were allowed to sell to refiners in deficit. Traded allowances accounted for 7% of the
market in 1983 and 20% of the market in 1984.
Originally,  unused allowances simply expired. However, beginning in 1985, firms were
allowed to hold in inventory, or "bank", unused allowances for use until the end of 1987, at which
time all gasoline would have to meet the 0.10 gplg standard. At the same time, EPA announced it
would tighten the standard from 1.10 to 0.50 gplg in July 1985 and to 0.10 in July 1986.
The introduction of banking dramatically altered the market for allowances.  Refiners were
anxious to bank allowances in anticipation of the tightening standards.  The number of lead rights
traded as a percentage of lead used increased sharply from 20% in the first quarter of 1986 to 60%
in the second quarter of 1987 (Hahn and Hester, 1989; Klaassen, 1996). The price of lead rights
jumped as well, moving from 0.75 cents gplg to more than 4.0 cents gplg (Nussbaum, 1992;
Klaassen, 1996).
Moreover, some smaller refiners began blending alcohol to their gasoline in order to more
rapidly reduce the lead content and generate surplus allowances -- an unforeseen outcome of the
new program. Allowances were banked early and average lead levels dropped to 0.70 in the first
quarter of 1985, well below the prevailing standard.  The industry met the 0.50 gplg standard well
ahead of schedule. When the 0.10 standard arrived in July 1986, refiners used banked credits to
temporarily exceed the standard. By the end of 1987, as the allowances expired, all refiners
complied with the 0.10 standard and no refiner requested additional time to meet the new
standard.
The program was not without its problems. The EPA failed to provide a certification
mechanism  for creating surplus allowances and some refiners produced bogus allowances for sale
as prices rose.  Computer systems became inadequate as the number of gasoline blenders rose.
The EPA faced a backlog in reviewing reported lead rights data and tracking potential violators
proved labor intensive.  Still, the EPA estimated that the trading provision saved the refining
industry $65 million in compliance costs while the banking provision reduced compliance costs by
an additional $226 million  (Nussbaum, 1992). Klaassen (1996) estimates the cost savings at about
$300 million  -- a cost reduction of roughly 20%.45
Originally,  EPA estimated  that the program  (without  the banking  provision)  would cost  the refiners  about $2.6  billion  (in
1983  dollars)  against  a $36 billion savings  in health costs  for  the general  public.
39Lessons for tradable permit markets
The lead phaseout program was one of the first experiments by a government regulatory
agency in traded emission rights.  The program was largely successful and proved cost-effective.
Importantly, the phased exit strategy generated a remarkably smooth transition.
The program demonstrated that pollution externalities can be internalized through
legislation and markets can be used to reallocate emission  rights to achieve efficiency  gains.
Because the program achieved environmental goals efficiently,  it became the prototype for
subsequent US national and regional programs.  The program also demonstrated that inventories
resulting from banking provisions can allow traders to arbitrage inter-temporal price differences in
a way similar to traditional commodity markets.  The program also showed that failure to clearly
certify allowances eligible  for trading creates opportunities for fraud and therefore clear
certification procedures have been a corner stone of subsequent trading schemes.
3. Sulfur dioxide allowances in the United States
Background
During the 1980s, nearly 70 bills were introduced in the US Congress to address the issue
of acid rain.  The debate ultimately resulted in Title IV of the more comprehensive 1990 US Clean
Air Act Amendments that provided for a cap-and-trade allowance system to control sulfur dioxide
(SO 2) emissions. The first phase of the program began in 1995 and covered the largest sources of
emissions. The second phase is to begin in 2000.
Significantly,  the approach departed from the traditional command-and-control approach
that had dominated US pollution policies. Based on an early cap-and-trade program that operated
during the phase-out of lead in US gasoline, the program was also significant in the scale of the
program.  The program aims at ultimately reducing S02 emissions by 40% from 1980 to 2010 by
monitoring more than 2,000 emission sources.  The program is broadly viewed as successful and
has been the basis of regional programs in the Los Angeles basin, Chicago, and the Northeast
states.
Tradable allowances are the cornerstone of EPA's  Acid Rain program and their
introduction proved controversial. The trading provision was based on the earlier success of the
lead phase-out program and the offset and netting provisions of the Clean Air Act. However, at
the time, the results of the limited practical experiences of tradable emission permits were mixed46.
Further, the basic morality of trading pollution permits was challenged by some. Kruger and Dean
(1997) cite a USA Today editorial declaring that "people will die" because of allowance trading.
Early environmental benefits help stemmed opposition.  The largest one-year drop in SO 2
emissions took place in 1995, the first year of the program.  Moreover, the some of the highest
emitting areas of the United States in Ohio and Indiana experienced the sharpest reductions.
Figure 11 summarizes annual S02 emissions.  Since that time, there has been a growing acceptance
and support for cap-and-trade systems in the United States as an effective and efficient mechanism
for limiting emission. In turn, this experience has shaped the US support for tradable permits in
proposed international treaties to limit greenhouse gases.
46 See  Hahn  and  Hester  for  an analysis  of both  programs.
40How it works
The program sets emissions standards for electric utility boilers based on historic 1985-87
average production levels and standard SO2/BTU  emission rates. 47 Allowances -- or emissions
permits-- are issued based on this formula and cover thirty years. 48 An allowance authorizes 49 an
owner to emit one ton of SO 2 during a given year. 50 If unused, the allowance can be banked for
future use or traded.
Although regulators use historic output to determine allowance allocations, future
allocations and use of the allowances are not linked. Utilities do not have to continue to operate
old boilers -- or any boilers -- in order to qualify  for allowances.  All utilities must match
emissions with allowances. 5'  Failure to comply results in heavy penalties and an equivalent
reduction in future allowances.  52
The program required 110 utilities operating the eastern and mid-western states of the US
to limit emissions from 263 large coal-fired boilers beginning in 1995 under Phase I of the
program.  In 2000, Phase II of the program begins at which time all of the estimated 2,050 electric
utility boilers in the US (with an output capacity of 25 megawatts or greater) will be subject to
similar restrictions.  These boilers account for about 99% of S02  emissions.  Overall program
limits are given in Table 4; however the totals are subject to some modification.  Allowances can
be created under other components of the program, including scrubber and conservation incentives
and opt-in programs.
The basic allocation for Phase I boiler units is approximately 5.5 million allowances for
each of the years 1995-1999.  However the program provides 3.5 million extra "bonus"
allowances to be allocated in Phase I as an incentive for utilities choosing to build Flue Gas
Desulfurisation systems (scrubbers) which reduce S02 emissions  by 90% to 95%.  Bonus
allowances will continue in each of the years 2000-2009. Bonus allowances will not exist after
2010, when the 8.95 MT cap comes into effect.
In addition, "new" allowances can be generated through two voluntary programs.  The
substitution program allows Phase II affected utility units to voluntarily enter Phase I of the Acid
Rain program.  The opt-in program allows all operating stationary combustion sources that emit
SO 2 but are not required to meet emission  limits to voluntarily enter the program. Both voluntary
programs entice facilities with low-cost abatement to enter the program in exchange for
allowances.  As added incentive, Phase II facilities "opting in" are able to grandfather NOx
emissions that are subject to separate regulations.  In some cases, the allowance serve as
47  Start-ups  between 1987  and 1995  are allocated  allowances  based  on a similar  formula. Boilers put in use after 1995  do not
qualify  for allowances.
48Permits  for the "31  d year" are issued  annually.
49 Allowances  are considered  permits,  rather than rights or property,  and the government  retains  the option  of recalling  the
allowances.  Nonetheless,  allowances  are actively  bought  and sold.
The  term "vintage"  refers to the year in which the permit is first eligible  for use.
51For  example,  in 1997  fims must have  a total of 1997  and earlier  vintage  allowances  registered  with the EPA that match  or
exceed  measured 1997  emissions.
52 The  penalty  for non-compliance  was set at $2,000  per ton in 1995  and was  indexed  to inflation. The current 1997  penalty  is
about  $2,500  per ton. In addition,  violating  utilities  must off offset  excess  emissions  with an equivalent  amount  off
allowances.  Utilities were 100%  compliant  during  the first two years of the program.
41compensation rather than incentive.  Because of separate state regulations, some facilities face
more stringent emission controls anyway and opt-in to receive allowances.
Costs and expectations
Administration of the program requires about 150 full time EPA staff, costing $60 million
in administrative costs for the first five years -- roughly $1.50/ton of carbon reduction (Mullins,
1997.)  The cost of monitoring is relatively high.  Continuous monitoring costs are estimated at
$120,000 per stack. Moreover, 1995 monitoring constituted about 7% of compliance costs
(Kruger and Dean, 1997). Individual projects can face much higher costs. A case study from New
England Power 53 reports total capital costs for continuous monitoring systems on 11 units
averaged $6 per kilowatt of capacity.  Still, proponents argue that in addition to measuring
compliance, the monitoring also produces information that facilitates the markets for allowances,
leading ultimately to lower compliance costs.
In fact, the US Government's General Accounting Office (GAO, 1994) estimated that the
cost of compliance with emission  limits at $2 billion a year. The same report estimated compliance
costs under an alternative command and control approach at $4.9 billion and attributed the cost-
savings to expected savings from allowance trading. The report also suggested the costs of the
program could drop to $1.4 billion should market prices for the tradable allowances fall. That
indeed appears to be the case.
The price of an allowance to emit one ton of SO 2 was valued by the EPA at $1,500 in
1990, but allowances traded at $150/ton as Phase I began in 1995 and dropped to $66/ton in
1996. In late 1997, spot prices had recovered to about $104/ton (Table 5.)  Analysts suggest
several reasons for the price declines 54. Primarily, market developments reduced the cost of
abatement. New investments in railroad infrastructure lowered the cost of delivering low-sulfur
coal to many plants.  Additionally,  natural gas and the scrubber industry found cost reductions as
well.  (Burtraw, 1996; Ellerman and Montero,  1996.) Transaction costs, which Doucet and
Strauss (1994) suggest were as high as $10 per allowance prior to auctioning, have dropped to as
low as $1.75 per allowance (Zorpette, 1994.) And, importantly, additional allowances issued as
incentives for installing scrubbers and for voluntary early inclusion have boosted supply. (Conrad
and Kohn, 1996.)  Additional local regulations may have depressed the demand for allowances as
well. In some cases, the policies have been explicit-- for example, specifying  the use of local coal,
or imposing specific technology, or granting accelerated depreciation of scrubber capital costs.
However, Bohi (1993) and Klaassen (1996) argue the tendency for regulators to allow utilities to
earn a return on scrubber capital costs while treating allowance costs as fuel costs creates a
general bias toward scrubber technology.  Further, Rico (1993) points out that utilities that owned
both Phase I and Phase H plants could generate Phase I emission reductions simply  by shifting
production.
Trading
After a slow start, allowance purchases have grown to more than 5 million  in 1995/96.
Currently more than 25% of all utilities and 50% of Phase I utilities have engaged in a trade with
Kenison  reported in Atkeson,  1997.
54  See Conrad  and Kohn for  review of various  explanations  for  the decline  in allowance  prices.
42another  utility,  broker or fuel company. In addition,  there are seven  companies  offering  brokerage
services. Moreover,  about 20 different  groups  have  purchased  and voluntarily  retired about 1,400
allowances.
In March 1994,  the US Environmental  Protection  Agency  (EPA) launched  an Allowance
Tracking  System. Trading  is open to all;  however  trades must be registered  ex post with the
EPA". Subsequently,  trading  data are posted on a public  Web  site. 56 An average  trade
registration  is completed  in 30 minutes  and all trades are registered  within  24 hours. The ATS
lists all parties  to the transaction  as well  as the vintage  of the allowance  trade, but does  not record
trade prices 57. However,  recently  private  traders  have  begun  to provide  indicator  prices  to the
public.
Originally,  program  developers  expected  that a formal  futures market  would  evolve  on the
Chicago  Board of Trade (CBOT). Indeed  the EPA held  back  about 2.8% of the allowances  to
guarantee  access  to allowances  for new entrants  and to facilitate  price  discovery  through  annual
auctions administered by the CBOT.  The CBOT announced in 1992 its intention to offer futures
and options  contracts  and the first auction  was held  in 199358.  However,  from  the start, the
auction proved  problematic.  EPA interpretation  of legislative  guidelines  resulted  in an process
that appears  to encourage  low offers 59 (Klaassen,  1996.) Solicited  bids  (demand)  are lined  up
from high to low and asks (supply)  from low  to high. The lowest asking  price is matched  with the
highest  bid and cleared. Then  the next pair are matched  until remaining  bids no longer exceed
remaining asks. As a result, firms that present relatively lower asking prices receive relatively
higher prices for their auctioned sales.
Contrary to expectations, the market for allowances evolved into an over-the-counter
market comprising primarily  brokers and utilities. (See Figure 12.) Such a structure is consistent
with the Phase I world of SO 2 trading, where there are relatively few major buyers and sellers and
counter-party  risk has not proved crucial. Still, early on, price discovery proved difficult  and
transaction  costs were high (Klaassen,  1996). However,  in recent  years,  brokerage  firms  have
emerged to handle a significant share of the market, information has become more readily available
and transaction costs have fallen (Walsh, Ramesh and Ghosh, 1996.)60
Another striking characteristic of the market for allowances is the small negative spread
between spot and forward prices. Early analysts had projected rising prices through time as S02
requirements became more stringent; however the banking provision allows firms to reduce future
costs by saving allowances early, effectively arbitraging costs over time (Ylaassen, 1996.)
Nevertheless, because of the time-value of money, holding current allowances in inventory is
costly. One explanation of the negative return to storage may lie in the callable nature of the
55  Buyers  and sellers  must either register  as agents  with the EPA  directly  or deal  through  a registered  trader.
56 The  ATS  can be accessed  at: http://www.epa.gov/docs/acidrain/atsdata2.htm1.
57  See the discussion  of the US SO2  program  in Annex  ?? for a discussion  of permit  vintages.
s Non-auction  trades were  underway  before  the first auction  when  in May 1992  Wisconsin  Power  and Light  traded 10,000
allowances  to the Tennessee  Valley  Authority.
Allowances  auctioned  come  from a pool  of withheld  allowances  and proceeds  from  the auction accrue  on a pro rata basis.
McLean  (1993)  argues  that the method  was  motivated  by politics  to insure  that Midwestern  utilities  - expected  to be net
sellers- would  receive  most of the revenues.
60  Centre  Financial  and Cantor-Fitzgerald  are significant  brokers  of cash  trades  and option  contracts  are available  from  Cantor-
Fitzgerald  and Enron.
43allowance.  Though  most in the industry  expect  no significant  program  changes,  the EPA retains
the authority  to limit,  revoke  or modify  the allowances  without  compensation.
Lessons for  tradable permnt markets
The US Acid  Rain program  is the most studied  and well  known  of the tradable  emissions
programs. It is widely  viewed  as successful  because  environmental  goals  have  been  met while
costs have  fallen  below  expectations. Its success  has heavily  influenced  US policy  toward
international  efforts  to control green  house gas emissions.
The prograum  provides  several  lessons  about  the political  economy  and institutional
arrangements  of tradable  permit  schemes. First, the program  was successful  in achieving
environmental  goals in an area  where success  had been elusive. This was especially  remarkable
given  the lack of widespread  initial  support  for the program. However,  by creating  and
distributing  wealth  in the form of permit  assets,  the Acid  Rain  program  created  a vested  interest  of
many  of the major players  in the success  of the regulatory  process. Further,  because  of the
banking  provision,  the program  produced  early  and significant  positive  environmental  effects. The
program  and subsequent  analysis  also demonstrate  the value  of information  -- especially  pricing
information  -- on the cost of doing  business. Even  though  the initial  vehicle  for price discovery,
the auction,  proved flawed,  private  intermediaries  emerged  to take up the function. The program
also points out the value -- and potential high cost -- of monitoring and registration.  On pricing,
the program  demonstrates  again  the difficulty  for policy  makers  to predict  the price of allowances
prior to their launch. By implication,  this means  that regulators  have  only  poor estimates  of the
cost of controlling  emissions.  In the case  of S02 allowances,  the relationship  between low-sulfur
coal, scrubbers  and  program  incentives  lead  to unpredicted  outcomes  and lower-than-expected
allowance  prices.
Table  4: Sulfur  dioxide  emission  limits  under  the US Acid  Rain program.
Year  Allowance  Limiit







44Fipure  11: Sulfur  dioxide  emissions  by regulated  US utilities.
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12_
10 
1980  1985  1990  1995
Table 5: S02 emission  allowance  prices
nearby*  6-year forward  7-year forward
Clearing  price $/ton  S02
1993  156.00
1994  150.00  140.00  140.00
1995  130.00  128.00  126.00
1996  66.05  64.15  63.01
1997  106.75  105.15  102.15
pixure  12: Composition  of S02 allowance  trade,  by market.
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464. The Dutch  covenant  with electricity  producers
Background"
In 1990 the national government and the 12 provinces of the Netherlands signed an
agreement, or covenant, 62 with the association of electricity producers (Samenwerkende
Electriciteits Producenten, or SEP) to reduce sulfur and nitrogen oxide emission by the year 2000.
Acid rain, a consequence of acidifying pollutants, is a regional problem and plants were already
subject to emission regulation; however, the covenant further reduced total emissions on aggregate
emissions from public power plants.  The goal of the covenant is to reduce S02 emissions from
1989 levels of 41 to 18 ktons by 2000, and to reduce NO, emissions from 74 to 30 ktons.  The
Covenant does not establish a system of tradable permits; however the system has similar
characteristics, since, beneath the bubble, firms are free to negotiate rights to emit. 63
How the system works
The electricity sector in the Netherlands is a cartel of mixed public ownership. Public
authorities own the companies that distribute electricity. In turn, the distribution companies,
provincial governments and local authorities own the four electricity producing companies in the
Netherlands.  Decisions regarding fuel use and plant utilization, as well as the price of electricity
delivered to the distribution companies are made by SEP.
The covenant sets goals for the sector, but leaves implementation strategy to SEP, with the
following exceptions: 1) all existing plants must meet minimum  emission standards; and 2)
relatively new plants are required to meet a second set of higher standards.
The goals are established by the covenant are not strictly binding. First, SEP can increase
the NO, cap up to 5 million kg by supplying heat from combined heat and power generating
plants. The sulfur cap can also be exceeded by 4 million  kg if scrubbers fail. Moreover, these
modified ceilings can also be exceeded by 3 million  kg once every three years.  In addition, the
covenant itself can be altered under certain circumstances.
The covenant requires SEP to establish an action plan for achieving the goals of the
agreement.  In turn an expert commission established by the Ministry of the Environment, the SEP
and the provinces reviews the plan. The SEP reports back to the commission every two years.
Individual producers report to the provinces and to the SEP. Provinces can defer implementing
the covenant in order to pursue other air quality standards.  Parties can alter the covenant and the
ceilings due to unexpected environmental events or if electricity demand or imports differ from
projections.  Further the covenant can be scrapped altogether if the ceilings cannot be met by
reasonable means, or if the parties fail to agree on the action plan.
61  This section  relies heavily  on Klaassen  (1996).
62Covenants  are negotiated  agreements  with  the status  of binding  contracts  in civil  law. Between 1990  and 1995,  the
Govermment  of the Netherlands  negotiated  fifteen  sector  agreements  designed  to meet the goals of the National
Environmental  Policy  Plan of the Netherlands.
63 Beginning  in 1996,  some  energy-intensive  industries  were offered  tax relief conditional  on meeting  voluntary  energy-saving
goals.
47Expected cost savings
According to the electricity producers, the covenant is expected to cut costs by 50% when
compared with setting stricter emission standards.  The savings come from achieving greater-than-
required emission  reductions at those facilities with longer remaining lifetimes. Klaassens (1996)
raises doubts about the cost-minimizing  behavior of the industry however pointing out the lack of
competition among electricity generators, and the linked ownership. However, some competition
does exist among distributors and large consumers are free to chose among distributors.
Lessons for  tradable permit  markets
The Dutch Covenants represent an alternative way of providing firms with an opportunity
to devise cost minimizing  ways of meeting regulatory goals.  The agreements are especially
appropriate to the Netherlands' integrated energy sector.  Traded-permit solutions generally
presume a number of independent profit-maximizing  agents, attributes that do not characterize the
Dutch electricity market.  Interestingly, the Dutch Covenant program will provide one test of
whether free markets are a precondition for solving this particular form of market failure.
It is too early to pre-judge the efficacy of the agreement. Certainly there is scope for
avoiding emission goals.  In addition, critics of the Covenants have argued that the process
encourages regulators to concentrate on evaluating the environmental action plan of regulated
companies, rather than monitoring emissions (Hersh, 1997.)  Still, the Covenant does provide an
alternative model that introduces the potential for cost minimizing  behavior.
5. Regional clean air  incentive market'
Background
In 1994 the South Coast Air Quality Management District (SCAQMD) introduced the
Regional Clean Air Incentives Market (RECLAIM) in the Los Angeles basin.  The program was
designed to improve air quality through the reduction of nitrogen oxides (NO.) and sulfur oxides
(SOx).
The region has the poorest air quality in the United States.  Despite 50 years of regulation,
the region, in 1994, was the only area in the nation classified  "as a severe non-attainment area" for
failing to meet current ozone standards (Prager, Klier and Mattoon, 1996.) Although significant
improvements were accomplished under earlier programs, the gains were overwhelmed by regional
growth.  Moreover, mobile sources such as cars, trucks and buses generated more half of the NO.
and reactive organic compounds, both ozone precursors, but were not subject to SCAQMD
controls. (Hall and Walton, 1996.)
Prior to the RECLAIM program, the AQMD regulated and monitored individual
equipment in each facility emitting NO, and SO..  Faced with the need to meet federal clean air
standards, AQMD estimated that it needed to reduce NO. and SO. emissions by 80% by 2003.
AQMD considered the cost and economic impact of a variety of solutions (Johnson and Pekelney,
1996) and estimated that a system of traded allowances would provide the most cost-effective way
of reaching emission goals.
64 See Prager,  Klier, and Matton  (1996)  for a more  complete  review of the history  and early  results of RECLAIM.
48How the system works
RECLAIM is a facility-specific,  cap-and-trade program. All facilities generating four tons
per year or more of NO, and SO. are subject to the RECLAIM cap. Initially, the program covered
390 NO. facilities and 41 SO. facilities. Under the program, each facility was given an allocation
of credits covering each source of emissions. The credits were time-stamped so that the credit
could only be used during a specified year.  Credits could not be "banked" -- that is, saved for use
in future years. Each year, firms were required to match credits with emissions from their facility.
Equipment-specific requirements were dropped.
Firms are allowed to trade credits; however two zones were created, one coastal and one
in-land.  All facilities can freely trade credits within zone, but because of prevailing winds and
weather conditions, coastal zone facilities cannot acquire credits from in-land facilities.
The allocation of credits was based on an initial starting level based on historic emissions
(base-year), subject to scheduled facility-specific  reductions based on requirements and goals
under the command system in place prior to RECLAIM. 65 Credits were issued for 1994 to 2010.
As a result, while emissions were expected to fall on average by 80%, rates of reduction varied
across firms.  Selecting the base-year proved contentious and ultimately the program designers
allowed each firm to chose one of the four years, 1989 to 1992, as its base year.  This resulted in
greater acceptance of RECLAIM, but also resulted in higher 1994 emissions.
There is also a provision for entry or expansion. New facilities, facilities that are relocated
or facilities that increase their emissions are subject to best available technology restrictions and
must acquire additional credits.  New credits can be generated through a program that scraps old
cars and trucks subject to a 30,000-vehicle limit.
Expectations and market prices
Before RECLAIM began, savings were expected to be significant, especially early in the
program.  Still, initial monitoring costs were expected to range from $1,500 for a minor source to
nearly $200,000.  Large sources use continuous emission monitors and all facilities are visited by
inspectors at least three times a year.
Early on, because of the flexibility  granted to facilities in choosing their base-year and the
declining allocations for future-dated allowances, planners expected futwue-dated  allowances to
trade at a high premium over near-term allowances. Moreover, based on abatement cost
estimates, allowances were expected to trade at prices trade at $4 to $5 per pound for NO, and $1
to $2 per pound for SO, in 1987 dollars. Prices above $6.70 per pound were to trigger a review
of the program's  efficacy. Table 6 reports the outcomes predicted by the planners' economic
model.
So far, emission allowances have traded at prices well below expectations and compliance
costs are well below predicted levels. To date, the highest amount paid for an auctioned allowance
was $1.04/pound -- in nominal dollars-- for a 2003 allowance. Figure 14 reports NOx auction
prices converted in 1987 dollars.
65
SCAQMD  produces  a Air Quality  Management  Plan every  three years. The 1991  plan became  the basis for budgeting
facility-specific  future  emissions.
49How the market for  credits works
Other than the prohibition on coast-inland trades, there are no significant  restrictions on
how credits are traded.  The trades do have to be registered with SCAQMD once they occur, but
SCAQMD doesn't auction or broker credits.  Entities other than RECLAIM facilities are free to
participate in the market.  Two private firms, the Automated Environmental Credit Exchange
(ACE) and the Clean Air Auction (CAA) handled most of the brokered trades.  Cantor Fitzgerald
runs CAA and ACE is managed by Sholtz and Associates, a consulting firm in cooperation with
the Pacific Stock Exchange.  ACE operates over the Internet and features five days of trading
every quarter. 66
Data on registered trades is available and has been analyzed by several authors.
Gangadharan (1997), and Prager, Klier and Mattoon (1996) find that early markets were thin and
information scarce -- driving up search costs.  In at least one case in August 1995 Cantor
Fitzgerald was unable to place an offer by Union Oil and returned the credits unsold.  A lack of
market information seemed to coincide with a more general lack of understanding by some
participating firms. During the first year of the program about 14% of the facilities failed to meet
standards -- despite the availability  of low-cost credits.
More recently trading information has become more readily available and volumes have
increased.  SCAQMD provides an electronic bulletin board where bids and asks can be posted 67.
ACE provides on-line trading information and information, and Cantor Fitzgerald offers a WEB
page with a ticker running at the bottom with current prices. Through 1996, about 50% of the
facilities traded NOx credits.  However only 33 facilities (about 9%) both bought and sold credits.
This group accounted for 75% of the 1995 vintage credits sold and 85% of the 1995 credits
bought.
Lessonsfor  tradable permit  schemes
RECLAIM has provided dramatic reductions in SOx and NOx emissions and has done so
in a cost-effective manner.  The failure of the earlier "command" system to reduce emissions, the
threat of EPA non-compliance consequences and the promise of flexibility  and low cost created
the political will to define strict standards.  As with other permit schemes, the creation and
distribution of tradable assets also gave the regulated an incentive  to support the regulatory
structure. Allowing temporary increases in emissions in exchange for long-run reductions also
eased acceptance. Early results, backed by a reliable monitoring system also garnered community
support.
The program also demonstrated the difficulty of establishing estimates of program costs
and allowance prices prior to implementation. Ex ante estimates proved to be highly inflated.
Monitoring costs are high, although the monitoring data is highly  valued by the market.  The
program also demonstrated the importance of market information. Early on information,
especially information about allowance transactions, was difficult  to obtain and raised transaction
costs.  Subsequently, private brokerage firms emerged, and public regulators increased efforts to
distribute market information resulting in lower transaction costs.
66 With private brokers caine trading in noxs and soxs.
67 See Cason and Gangadharan (1997) for an experimental study of the bulletin board system and price discovery.
50Table 6: Expected  prices and  compliance  costs.
RTC  prices  Compliance  Costs  Jobs foregone
Year  NOx  SOx  savings  Rec/CAC  Reclaim  CAC
1994  $  0.26  $  0.26  $  38.2  21%  (771)  347
1995  $  0.26  $  0.68  $  97.8  12%  (716)  89
1996  $  4.21  $  2.79  $  46.6  62%  (674)  2,619
1997  $  4.09  $  1.37  $  32.9  74%  2,205  3,332
1998  $  3.96  $  1.33  $  67.7  65%  1,990  2,569
1999  $  5.03  $  1.29  $  64.0  72%  3,163  3,096
Notes:  Prices  are in 1987  $US/pound;  compliance  cost savings  are in 1987  $ millions.
Source:  Johnson  and Pekelney,  1996.
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